Campaign and battle of Lynchburg, Va.

by Charles Minor Blackford

But before we return to the scenes around Lynchburg incident to the attack, it may well be noted that Hunter, after reaching Salem, turned off to Lewisburg, West Virginia, and did not feel safe until he had placed his army far beyond the Alleghanies and upon the banks of the Ohio at Parkersburg. The effect of this remarkable line of retreat was that the Valley was left open, and Early seized the opportunity and at once commenced his march for the Potomac practically unmolested. On the 5th of July Hunter and his command were at Parkersburg, on the Ohio, while Early, whom he was to obstruct, was crossing the Potomac River into Maryland.

Poor Hunter! he seems to have had few friends, and it is almost cruel to recite his history, but men who undertake great enterprises must expect to be criticised when they fail. He got little comfort, and expected none, from the Confederate leaders, but he got even less from the Federal, except when it came in the form of such reports as that sent by Captain T.K. McCann to General Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, in which he says that "General Hunter fought four hours on the 17th; on the 18th the General ascertained that Rebel force at Lynchburg was fifty-thousand men, and from a prisoner taken it was reported that Lee was evacuating Richmond and falling back on Lynchburg, and consequently General Hunter was obliged to fall back." (Id. 679.) General Grant, however, on the 21st of June, wrote General Meade to know where Hunter was, and said, "Tell him to save his army in the way he thinks best." (Id. 657.)

On the 17th of July Halleck wrote to Hunter, giving him some directions in regard to his future movements, saying that "General Grant directs, if compelled to fall back, you will retreat in front of the enemy towards the Potomac, so as to cover Washington and not be squeezed out to one side, so as to make it necessary to fall back into West Virginia to save your army." This order he disregarded most ignominiously.

In the same letter Halleck wrote Hunter that General Grant said that in the marching he does not want houses burned, but "that he wants your troops to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they can, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the year will have to carry their rations with them." (Id. 366.)

C.A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote to Grant on the 15th of July (Id. 332): "Hunter appears to have been engaged in a pretty active campaign against the newspapers in West Virginia." And Halleck on the same day wrote to Grant that he thought "Hunter's command was badly used up in the Lynchburg expedition." (Id. 331.)

These assaults, and many others of a like nature, wounded General Hunter so greatly that he not only asked to be relieved, but wrote a letter to Grant, in which, after speaking of the depressing effect upon him of these comments, he unstopped the vials of his wrath against his subordinates, upon whom he put the blame of his defeat.

In this letter he says that Sullivan, who commanded one of his divisions, was "not worth one cent; in fact very much in my way," and, again, he says: "I dashed on toward Lynchburg, and should certainly have taken it if it had not been for the stupidity and conceit of that fellow Averell, who unfortunately joined me at Staunton, and of whom I unfortunately had, at the time, a very high opinion, and trusted him when I should not have done so." (71 W. of R. 366.)

With these quotations from the correspondence of his associates, General Hunter may be left to the verdict which will be accorded him by the future historian of the stirring events in which he took part.

War is not a gentle occupation, and its customs are harsh. To make it effective, it is clearly within the rules of civilization to strip an enemy's country through which a hostile army is passing of everything which will sustain the life of either men or beasts. Hence Grant's historic order about the crow carrying his rations, while cruel, is within the line of legitimate warfare. But putting non-combatants to death, insults to women and children, the wanton destruction of household goods and clothes, the application of the torch to dwellings, factories and mills, or the destruction of public buildings, and especially of institutions of learning and their libraries, and works of art and science, is a style of warfare long since relegated to the savage. The disgrace of reviving this barbaric strife in modern times was reserved for Hunter. General Crook, one of his division commanders, a soldier brave and true, felt constrained to note the conduct of the troops, and published an order in which he says he "regrets to learn of so many acts committed by our troops that are disgraceful to the command." Hunter knew all this, but there was no word of protest or repression from him.

It is to be regretted that later in this campaign, when we carried the war across the Potomac, some of our troops retaliated for these brutal acts, upon innocent parties. That Hunter had set the example was no good excuse, though it was pled. (See General Bradley T. Johnson's Report, 90 W. of R. 7.)