Campaign and battle of Lynchburg, Va.

by Charles Minor Blackford

On the 9th of June, 1864, when Averell's plan was laid before Hunter, he approved and adopted it. He was then at Staunton, Virginia, in command of an army, the exact number of which is not disclosed by the records. The official report for the month of May, 1864, for that department, discloses the fact that upon the 31st of that month there was in it an aggregate present for duty of 36,509. (70 Id. 571.) The published correspondence shows that during the month of May every possible effort was made to concentrate these forces, and it seems from the roster that every brigade and division in the department was represented at Staunton when the expedition started. Hence, making due allowance for heavy details on guard, provost and escort duty, it may well be claimed that when the start was made there were present for duty, of all arms, at least 25,000 men, fresh and well equipped. (Id. 103.)

Some of these troops, like their leader, were renegades from the traditions and instincts of their forefathers, and hence very little to be trusted, but far the greater proportion of the force was composed of high types of the soldier from Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, and, under a proper leader, would have been very formidable. The want of such a leader, despite the efficient aid of able subordinates, made the campaign a fiasco with no historical parallel, except, perhaps, that of the famous King of France, who,

"With twenty thousand men,
Marched up the hill, and then marched down again."

Hunter's army consisted of four divisions, two of infantry, commanded respectively by Generals Sullivan and Crook, and two of cavalry, severally commanded by Generals Duffie and Averell. Each division consisted of three brigades, and they were accompanied by eight batteries of artillery, with an aggregate of thirty-two guns.

Major-General David Hunter, the commander, was a Southerner by race and environment, and members of his family had often been honorably connected with the history of the State of Virginia. He had been an officer in the United States army, and on the breaking out of the war between the States, ignored the traditions of his race and took up arms against Virginia. It is not the custom of those of Virginian blood to be disloyal to their State, and it is her proud boast that the roll of those who have been false is very short. What moved Hunter to act as he did must be developed by his biographer; it is enough for the historian to record the fact of his apostasy. Most Southern officers in the old service disapproved the secession of the States, but on the breaking out of the war, with rare exceptions, they resisted the powerful temptations held out as inducements to stay and join the Northern army. They preferred poverty and the uncertainties of the approaching conflict to a military distinction which could only be won by shedding the blood of their brothers and friends. With this faith they joined in the defence of their several States whether they agreed with them in their political course or not. Such was the course of the Lees and the Johnsons, of Stuart and the Hugers, of the Maurys, and of hundreds of others who stood by their people, right or wrong. They believed it alike the path of duty and of honor to draw their swords in defence of their native land, in the hour of its greatest need, and they turned a deaf ear to the whisper of that tempting thrift which is so often the reward of fawning.

When Hunter and his army were approaching Staunton, a part of his force, estimated at about eight thousand men, had a battle with a small, disorganized detachment under General Wm. E. Jones, at a place called Piedmont, near Port Republic. The troops under Jones were much worn, and were weary with hard work, sharp fighting and scant rations. Those of Hunter were fresh, vigorous and well equipped. Jones and his men fought well, but he was killed early in the action. His death had a bad effect on his command, and it gave way in much confusion and with heavy loss. Much good was done during the confusion by Lieutenant Carter Berkeley and his two ubiquitous guns, which afterwards did such good service in the lines around Lynchburg and upon Hunter's retreat.

After this disaster, Jones's command, under Vaughan, fell back first to Fishers ville and Waynesboro, and then towards Charlottesville. This left the Valley open as far as Buchanan, except for the small, but ever vigilant force of cavalry, so skillfully and manfully handled by Brigadier-General John McCausland, who had shortly before been transferred from the command of an infantry to a cavalry brigade.

Imboden, with a small body of cavalry, which had escaped from the battle of Piedmont, and which was badly mounted and equipped, had crossed the Blue Ridge and was energetically attempting to defend the Orange & Alexandria Railroad (now the Southern), in Nelson and Amherst Counties, from a heavy detachment from the column of General Duffie, sent by Hunter to destroy that road for the purpose of cutting off reinforcements from Lynchburg.

After the death of General Jones and the defeat of his little army, Hunter blew his trumpets with boastful triumph. Staunton, of course, forthwith fell into his hands, which was the occasion for another blast. General Hunter, in his report of the battle of Piedmont, written on June 8, says, with pride, that his "combined force, now in fine spirits and condition, will move, day after to-morrow, toward the accomplishment of its mission," which was the capture of Lynchburg, and the destruction of its bridges and stores. (70 W, of R. 95).

The plan of campaign which General Averell had suggested and Hunter had adopted, was a movement up the Valley to Buchanan in four columns, each column composed of a division, commanded respectively by himself, Crook, Sullivan and Duffie. The last-named division was to march in the same direction on the western slope of the Blue Ridge, sending raiding parties through the gaps to destroy the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, and was finally to move through White's Gap to Amherst Courthouse, whence it was to march toward the James River, cross it below Lynchburg, cut the James River & Kanawha Canal, destroy the Southside Railroad, and then move up the river and join in the attack upon the objective point of the campaign. (70 W. of R. 146).