“I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) “Chas. Napier, Commodore.
“P.S.—I forgot to mention that the Emir Bechir did not come up in time, but did good service in checking the reinforcement of 2000 men that was intended to join Ibrahim.
“C.N.”
“To Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford.”
CHAPTER XIII.
Necessity for disobeying the Orders to return to D’Jounie—Advantageous results—Difference with Izzet Pacha—his Character—Unmolested retreat of Souliman Pacha—he should have been closely followed up—Letter from the Admiral—The Author resigns the Command—Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Unsuccessful attack on Tortosa.
It is necessary in war, and I think quite justifiable, to take responsibility on oneself in unforeseen cases, running of course the risk of answering for the consequences; it is more dangerous, however, to disobey orders; but there are instances in which events may justify such disobedience; the reader will judge whether what I have related may be considered one of them.
I saw clearly that the Admiral was not at all aware of the critical position in which I was placed. When I left D’Jounie it was with the intention of joining the Grand Prince, and attacking Souliman Pacha, who was encamped before Beyrout, leaving four battalions in our position, to secure it against an unforeseen attack. On my arrival on the heights of Ornagacuan, I was as much surprised to find myself in front of Ibrahim, as I suppose he was to find himself opposed to me; he was evidently collecting troops to attack D’Jounie, which he ought to have done long before, and we were collecting ours to attack Souliman. Finding ourselves unexpectedly opposed to each other, it was distinctly my game to attack him before his force was assembled[assembled]. Had I obeyed the orders that were sent me to return to D’Jounie I should have had a most difficult and dangerous retreat, and been harassed by an enemy to whom we should have restored confidence. It would have been impossible to have sent timely notice to Omar Bey or the Prince, both of whom would have been sacrificed, the Turks would have lost confidence, and as the season was fast advancing I have no doubt the whole would have been re-embarked, and the expedition entirely failed. What, on the contrary, happened? the ships going to Beyrout, and my advance, caused the abandonment of the town; the victory, the dispersion of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, and, as will be shortly seen, the disorganization of the Egyptian troops, and the retreat of Souliman.
On the morning of the 11th Izzet Pacha joined me, and shortly after I received information that 2000 of Souliman’s soldiers had deserted; I immediately put the troops in motion, intending to march on him, having had no information that he had decamped; to this Izzet objected; the old man was afraid of being left at D’Jounie, and insisted on two battalions being sent there. I offered him one for his protection; this did not satisfy him; he invented all sorts of stories,—first, that Ibrahim was again collecting his forces, and was advancing,—and many others of the same nature; and when he found I was inexorable, he said the weather was changing and the troops would all get wet. This was quite true; we had not seen a cloud the whole summer, but now the sky became overcast, and there was every appearance of a storm; I, however, observed to old Izzet that I never understood that a shower of rain was a sufficient reason to prevent an attack upon an enemy’s camp. The troops were ordered to march, and Izzet returned to D’Jounie, and on announcing his approach by firing his pistols in the usual way, one went off by accident and wounded him in the leg; it is a pity it had not gone through his head, for never was there a more unfit man to govern a country than the man in question: he had once before lost a Turkish army by starvation, had cut off his own wife’s head, and was a notorious tyrant and savage; and this was the man chosen to govern the Syrians. Representations were made to the Porte, and they very wisely recalled him.