The southern squadron being anchored in the bay, with their stern to the beach, and their broadsides bearing on the Mole, remained at anchor also; and fortunately they did, for their position certainly contributed to decide the Governor to abandon the town, which he did after midnight, taking the greatest part of the garrison with him.
Towards the west side there was no breach, and the walls were much too high to surmount without scaling-ladders, which were left behind, with the exception of a few in the Princess Charlotte. Towards the south the walls were lower, but still they were not breached; and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much loss, and, considering the season of the year, it would have been worth their while to have made the experiment. Be that as it may, it was decided to evacuate the town. What number was withdrawn, and finally escaped, is difficult to say, as many deserted on the march and came over in the morning, and others were picked up by the irregular cavalry who had joined from the country. Before the attack on the fortress, a regiment of Egyptian cavalry, with their flying artillery, encamped outside, charged the mountaineers who had collected in some force; these, although they behaved with great gallantry, were quite unequal to resist the disciplined Egyptians, and suffered severely. The loss of the enemy’s force during the battle, by the explosion, must have been very great; an entire battalion, who were formed near the magazine ready to resist any attempt to storm, were entirely destroyed; and nothing could be more shocking than to see the miserable wretches, sick and wounded, in all parts of this devoted town, which was almost entirely pulverized. The Turks paid little attention to the poor creatures, and many were seen lying in all directions dying for want of seasonable relief.
CHAPTER XVII.
Difference between the Admiral and the Author—The Author’s Orders—Captain Berkeley’s Orders—The Author applies for a Court Martial, but is refused—Correspondence with the Admiral—The Admiral’s Dispatches.
At daylight in the morning I went on board the Phœnix steamer, where the Admiral still was; he received me on the quarter-deck, and, after congratulating him on the capture of Acre, I said, I hoped he was satisfied with the position I had taken up. To which, to my great surprise, he replied, in a most abrupt manner, “Not at all! you ought to have gone on to the south-west angle.” Such a reproof on the quarter-deck of a man-of-war, and on such an occasion, given by the Commander-in-Chief to his second in command, even had he committed an error of judgment, cannot be justified, particularly after the services I had brought to so happy a termination on shore, and which had been frequently acknowledged by him.
That the squadron were not anchored so well as they might have been, is quite true, but no blame could be attributed to me, nor did I attribute any to others. When I attacked from the north I never doubted but the ships astern would pass on in the same manner as if I had attacked from the south, and anchor in a line ahead. But Captain Fanshawe, in the Princess Charlotte, as I have before stated, being impressed with the idea that, under any circumstances, he was to take his station astern of the Powerful, and believing we were in shoal water, anchored astern, as did the other ships who were under the same impression, and who had orders to anchor in succession, of which I was not aware. The Revenge, however, being in reserve, corrected the mistake.
I had frequently been engaged with batteries last war, and I believe was the only officer in the squadron who had ever commanded a ship in action against stone walls, and the system I followed was the one I had always been accustomed to; it was the plan followed by the leading ship at the battle of the Nile, and I am not aware that Lord Nelson found fault with Sir Samuel Hood for anchoring abreast of the leading ship; and if that is the tactics to be followed in attacking a line of ships, it is certainly the same that ought to be followed in attacking a line of stone walls. I never saw, in the whole course of my service, the leading ship run along a whole line of either ships or batteries; neither did I ever hear of such a thing. There are two palpable inconveniences attending such an attack; the first is, the leading ship would be disabled before she got to her station; the second, if the ships were in close order of battle, it would be perfectly impossible, in the smoke, for the next ship astern to know the exact moment her leader anchored, and she most probably would run aboard of her, and those astern would fall into the same difficulty. The fact is, the officers were not called on board of the flag-ship, and the plan of the place, and the plan of attack, under all circumstances, was never pointed out to them; each captain had separate instructions, and one did not know the orders of the other. I have before stated, that the first evening the attack was arranged between Captain Boxer and the Admiral, which I fortunately succeeded in changing. The officers were not sent for afterwards, for I went immediately on board my own ship, where I remained till my signal was made to go to the Admiral, (the breeze having sprung up,) who wished to ask my opinion, if we should attack, which was agreed upon; and I think Captain Fanshawe was the only captain there; I certainly never saw either Captain Austin or Captain Berkeley, nor did I know they were ordered to anchor in succession. The orders I received were as follows:
“Princess Charlotte, off Acre,
Nov. 2, 1840.
“Memorandum.—The Princess Charlotte and Powerful are to be ready at daylight to-morrow morning to take their stations along the west front of the battery at Acre, at a distance of about 500 yards, and to commence firing upon the batteries on shore, which is to be continued until the whole seawall is destroyed.