[66]. See General Jochmus’s letter and accompanying statement, in Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 305-307.
[67]. See Levant Papers, Part III., pp. 282, 332.
[68]. Ibid., pp. 309, 310.
[69]. Ibid., p. 307.
[70]. “Does not this division of Ibrahim’s army at El-Mezereib at once convince any military man that he considered peace as concluded; and that a want of provisions was the only enemy he had to fear? he therefore divided his troops, so that one arm should not retard the other.
“Cavalry, by forced marches, were enabled to get on faster than the infantry, encumbered as they were by women, &c., and barley was no doubt very scarce.
“In a military point of view, either in advancing or retreating in an enemy’s country, it would be considered very injudicious to have infantry without cavalry on the route; that Ibrahim knew this well, his sending for the two regiments of cavalry of the guard, on finding at Rieha (Jericho) that the Turkish troops were in position to resist his march via Hebron, fully shows.”
[71]. “The number of the guns has been variously stated, but I believe they were between 150 and 200.”