“Very shortly after this, Rechid Pacha returned with your Excellency, when the same points were distinctly stated, and you expressed your conviction of the impossibility of Ibrahim’s coming upon Gaza; that we should advance close to it, and you would send notice to the Egyptian troops, that they might have twenty-four hours to retreat, after which you[you] would attack and occupy Gaza. Rechid Pacha said he would go immediately to Jerusalem, from whence he would write positive information, upon which we might safely rely; that we should not move from this place until we received his communications. After his departure, General Michell and I paid your Excellency two visits, in which we found out, on examination of maps and Egyptian officers who had deserted from Gaza, that it was not only possible but very probable that Ibrahim might come on Gaza by the end of the Dead Sea, and that he might reach it within two days of the time in which your troops could. You then avowed that your aim was not to facilitate his retreat, but to annihilate his army, and prevent a single Egyptian getting back to his own country.
“The Seraskier Zacharias Pacha, your Excellency, General Michell, and myself had a meeting this forenoon, at which you stated it to be your determination to advance; that you had ordered the troops at Jerusalem to make a combined movement on Gaza with those from Ramla; and that 6000 men and 1400 cavalry (900 of them being irregular), with twenty-four guns, would attack Gaza, destroy the provisions, and immediately retire, leaving two battalions in the place; that if Ibrahim Pacha appeared you would retire, and that, if he pressed you, you could retreat on the mountains near Jerusalem. There appeared to General Michell and to me such an evident and imminent hazard in this operation, and so inadequate an object to be gained, so much evil would result from a retrograde movement, such disaster from defeat, that I declared I could be no party to it, and that so long as it was not ascertained beyond doubt that Ibrahim Pacha was not coming on Gaza, I could not afford any naval co-operation.
“It is with sincere pain that I have come to this resolution; your Excellency has had no reason to doubt the hearty co-operation hitherto of Her Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in promoting the Sultan’s cause; but I should be betraying my trust, and acting in direct opposition to my orders, if I concurred in any operations which had for their object the prevention or suspension of Ibrahim Pacha’s evacuation of Syria.
| “I have, &c., (Signed) “Houston Stewart, “Captain and Senior Officer commanding H.B.M. ships and vessels on the Coast of Syria.” |
| “Sir, | “Head-quarters, Jerusalem, “January 25, 1841. |
“I had the honour to receive your letter of the 12th of January only on the 17th, and active operations have prevented my answering this before.
“It would be superfluous to enter now into any details on its varied contents, since fortune and victory have declared on all sides for me by the total rout of the Egyptians, thus consoling me, in a certain degree, for that want of confidence in my judgment which it is evident you entertain, with respect to my operations in the field. Unskilful as I may be deemed as a military commander, it must at least be confessed, from the recent march of events, that I am certainly a very fortunate one. I must, however, most distinctly advert to, and refute two points upon which a great part of the critical acumen, contained in the letter in question, appears to be erroneously based; stating first, that I am not aware of any person in Syria being in the secret of my operations, and cognizant of all my plans, until after their execution, since I consider secresy the mainspring of success; and secondly, that I do not admit the right of any naval officer, on a special station, to attempt to control those operations, in the way you have thought proper to assume, upon the same principle, as I suppose would guide you, were I to presume to give you a lesson on the best mode of managing your ship. At the same time I am, and have always been, most happy to receive any opinion or explanation, provided they be given with the courtesy and respect due to the General intrusted with the operations of the army.
“It is to me a matter of regret, that after the transcendant services rendered by the British fleet in the very last operation, you should have thought proper to decline any naval co-operation in the projected movements on Gaza, but it certainly is to me much more a cause of surprise, that you should have thought proper to write an official letter, on an occasion where naval co-operation could not even make any serious impression on the inland position of the enemy, and where the sole column of Ramleh was more than doubly sufficient to attain my object. It is well known, that after the defeat of part of the Egyptian cavalry at El-Maishdell on the 15th instant, the enemy never ventured again to meet our troops beyond the river Ascalon, although I advanced our cavalry, which was not half his in number, on the following day, and left it encamped within an hour and a half’s march of Gaza, whilst, at the same time, I sent the infantry and artillery into Jaffa, on account of the inclement weather and impracticable state of the roads. Under these circumstances, it would, in my opinion, have been perfectly consistent with your responsibility, not to have given any naval assistance in this operation, but without officially declining it after my return to Jaffa, the more so, as I fully agreed with you on the impossibility of the steamers being of any immediate use; but it seems to have been your particular desire to have made the whole transaction a matter of official correspondence, which, although I do not decline, I would fain hope is now brought to a close.
| “I have, &c., (Signed) “A. Jochmus, Lieut.-General, “Commanding the Army of Operation.” |
“To Capt. Houston Stewart, R.N.,