“The cavalry,” observes the General, “are reduced to 2500 horses and 700 dismounted horsemen, in a miserable condition, and if it had not been for the Convention”—(oh! that Convention!)—“two battalions, in the almost impracticable passes of Wadi-el-Ghor, would have been sufficient to stop the columns.” To catch a bird you must put salt on his tail,—to stop the columns they must have come through the Ghor, which, according to Col. Napier, they never did, having only crossed it to the south of the Dead Sea, on their way to Gaza.
Hassan Pacha, who commanded the division to which Colonel Napier was attached, reported that he had sent a safe conduct to Achmet Menikli Pacha, commander of the Egyptian cavalry, and that his officer conducted him to Gaza. Colonel Napier knows nothing of this, nor does Lieutenant Loring, who, after communicating with this division, set out in search of Ibrahim, of whom he could get no tidings, and returned to Gaza; therefore the safe conduct must have existed only in Hassan Pacha’s imagination, or if he did send it, it certainly never arrived; but if it was sent, more shame to the Turkish authorities, who not only meditated attacking Ibrahim, fancying his army was destroyed, but had actually given orders to that effect. This Captain Stewart ascertained from Rechid Pacha, who admitted that orders had been sent to General Jochmus to act upon Ibrahim’s line of march, and impede it as much as possible, abstaining at the same time from any direct attack. But as Ibrahim’s troops began to arrive in a very different state from that which this gentleman expected, he changed his mind and set out for Jaffa, post haste, overtook the courier with the letter, and put it into Colonel Bridgeman’s hands, who immediately protested in the council against such proceedings[[62]], which would compromise the honour both of Great Britain and Turkey, after the guarantees that had been exchanged between Captain Stewart, Colonels Rose and Alderson, and the Egyptian Generals[[63]]. This decided conduct of Colonel Bridgeman had the desired effect; promises were given that no hostile movement should be made, but every possible assistance should be afforded. These assurances were kept, but more owing to the strength of Ibrahim than to the good faith of the Turkish authorities; and as for Rechid, the officer who recommended the movement against Ibrahim, I am informed by an eye-witness, that he went into Ibrahim’s presence with fear and trembling, using the words, “Il m’assassinera,” and absolutely stooped down and kissed the hem of his garment.
On the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha he approved of the conduct of his Generals, and made the following reply to the Seraskier:—
“Your Highness,
“I am going from Syria for Egypt. Your letter has reached me; the Egyptian troops are concentrating in Gaza, and when they have their necessary supplies, they will go immediately according to your wishes.
“I have written this to you in a friendly manner and have sent it to your Highness.
(Signed) “Ibrahim.”
Being duly informed of the arrival of Ibrahim, and how affairs were going on in Syria, I wrote as follows to Lord Minto and Viscount Palmerston:—
| “My Lord, | “Carysfort, Alexandria, February 5, 1841. |
“Ibrahim Pacha arrived at Gaza on the 31st, with the rear-guard of the Syrian army; he has brought from Syria between 20,000 and 30,000 men, including 6000 cavalry in good order.