“5th. During peace, Egypt can be protected by 18,000 soldiers; this number shall not be exceeded; and as the land and sea forces of Egypt are at the disposal of the empire, the Porte, in case of war, will fix the augmentation which it is requisite to give to them. In the other parts of the empire, the soldier, after a service of five years, is free; this rule shall be enforced in Egypt. Consequently, there shall be chosen from the existing army, and according to the periods of service, 20,000 men, of whom 18,000 shall serve in Egypt, and 2000 shall be sent to Constantinople. Every year a ballot shall be had, in conformity with the rules of equity, and in proportion to the population of each district, for the levy of 4000 men, of whom 3600 shall be incorporated into the troops of Egypt, and 400 shall be sent to Constantinople, the whole to replace those who are discharged. The soldiers liberated from service shall not be re-enlisted. It is possible that as regards the material, the troops cannot be clad in Egypt as they are at Constantinople, but as regards the shape of the clothing, the badges, and the standards, they shall be wholly alike. The same is the case with regard to the naval forces.

“6th. The Viceroy of Egypt cannot confer ranks except up to that of Solkal-Aghassi (adjutant-major); as regards the superior ranks, they must be applied for to the Sublime Porte.

“New ships of war shall not be built without the permission of the Porte.

“The continuance of the hereditary succession being subject to the execution of each of these fundamental dispositions, in case of non-execution, the concession of hereditary succession will be revoked.”

Another firman conferred upon the Pacha the government (not hereditary) of the provinces of Nubia, Darfour, Kordofan, and Sennaar. This firman forbids the incursion of the troops into these provinces, who had been permitted to seize the inhabitants, male and female, and retain them as slaves in lieu of pay. He was also prohibited from reducing the slaves to the state of eunuchs, a common practice in Egypt.

The Pacha pointed out to me how impossible it was to comply with the firman relative to the hereditary title. That in the first place, with respect to the Porte choosing his successor from any of his family, that it was a blow directed against Ibrahim Pacha, which was both unjust and impolitic. That he was his eldest son, and well worthy of succeeding him; besides which, even if he consented to such a condition, it was by no means clear that Ibrahim would, and even if he did, it would sow the seeds of dissension in his family. That as to the appointment of his officers, it had always been the practice to allow the Pacha of Egypt to appoint them up to the rank of General, and that the proposed restrictions would dissatisfy the army, and probably cause a mutiny. The 3rd Article, stipulating that he was to pay a fourth of the revenue of Egypt to the Porte, appeared to him oppressive to Egypt. He asked my advice how to act in his present position. This was a delicate question; I had no instructions from home, nor from the Admiral, who was at Malta, and no communication of any description from Lord Ponsonby, and simply a letter from Colonel Hodges, stating the fact of the firmans having been sent, and his opinion that the conditions would not be accepted by the Pacha.

The reasons the Pacha gave for rejecting parts of the firman were so just and so strong, that I did not hesitate to express my opinion that they ought not to be accepted, and I advised him to write to the Porte, and respectfully point out the impossibility of his accepting such terms.

I knew in doing this I was taking a good deal of responsibility on myself, as it was probable these terms had been suggested to the Porte by some of the Ambassadors, if not by all; but, being on the spot, and seeing that should Ibrahim, who was at the head of a large army, resist, and be supported in his resistance by the officers of the army, which was pretty certain, the whole country would be thrown into confusion, I knew I should incur censure for not taking upon myself the responsibility of advising the Pacha to adopt what I thought was the safest course. Had the British and the other Consuls been at Alexandria, I should have left it entirely to them.

The following is my letter to Lord Palmerston, relating the whole occurrence:—

“My Lord,