“The difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan was placed, and which decided him to apply for the support and the assistance of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, being now removed, and Mehemet Ali having made towards His Highness the Sultan the act of submission which the Convention of the 15th of July was designed to bring about, the Representatives of the Courts, parties to the said Convention, have considered that, independently of the execution of the temporary measures resulting from that Convention, it is of essential importance to record in the most formal manner, the respect which is due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.
“This principle being from its nature one of general and permanent application, the respective Plenipotentiaries, provided with the orders of their Courts to this effect, have been of opinion that, in order to manifest the agreement and union which regulate the intentions of all the Courts in what concerns the maintenance of the peace of Europe, it would be proper to record the respect which is due to the above-mentioned principle, by means of an arrangement in which France should be invited to concur, at the invitation, and agreeably to the wish, of the Sultan.
“This arrangement being calculated to afford to Europe a pledge of the union of the Five Powers, Her Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, agreeably to an understanding with the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, undertook to bring this matter to the knowledge of the French Government, requesting it to take part in an arrangement by which, on the one hand, the Sultan should declare his firm resolution to maintain for the future the above-mentioned principle; the Five Powers, on the other hand, should announce their unanimous determination to respect that principle and to conform themselves thereto.
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On the 6th of March Mehemet Ali’s and Said Muhib Effendi’s letters to the Vizier arrived at Constantinople[[112]]. Mehemet Ali’s, in respectful terms, and with great clearness, pointed out the impossibility of his consenting to the first, third, and part of the sixth articles of the Firman; the other articles he cheerfully acceded to. The Commissioner makes a long report of the arguments he used to induce Mehemet Ali to consent, and the very clever way he evaded them; and it must be admitted the old Pacha had the best of the argument.
The Porte, as might have been expected, was now in a false position; France had so far joined the Allies as to initial the Treaty for shutting the Dardanelles, but it was not likely she would now attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali or even advise him to yield; and under this embarrassment Rechid Pacha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Ministers for advice. Lord Ponsonby did not hesitate to entirely agree with Rechid Pacha that the application of Mehemet Ali to change some of the articles of the Firman was no proof of submission[[113]]. The Firman, says the Ambassador, is an order, and no subject can refuse to obey an order and be considered submissive; he does not admit that he petitioned for a change, but he asserts that he disobeys. I cannot read Mehemet Ali’s letter in that sense. After giving his reasons why the hereditary succession should go by right of primogeniture, which appear to me convincing, he states, “It is evident, moreover, that his Highness, moved by sentiments of clemency, desires the maintenance of repose and tranquillity, and it is for that reason that I request that the question of the hereditary succession may be settled as has been stated above.” Surely this may be considered petitioning, and in a moderate way too, when we recollect that Mehemet Ali knew full well that the Porte had no means of enforcing these orders.
What the Ambassador says of the preparations Mehemet Ali was making for resistance is incorrect. I was at Alexandria at the time, and I saw no new preparations; there were a few men completing his unfinished works, which were so ill constructed that if not attended to they would have crumbled to pieces. He was certainly reorganizing his army, after the retreat, which was absolutely necessary; but even had he been preparing for resistance could he be blamed? The Firman that was sent to him was so perfectly absurd that no man in his senses, with an army of 50,000 or 60,000 man, and upwards of 10,000 cavalry, would have accepted such terms from a weak master; and no set of men, possessed of common understanding, and knowing the relative position of the Porte and Mehemet Ali, would have counselled such a Firman. The Ambassador finishes by recommending the Porte to do nothing till they have heard from Great Britain.
Baron Stürmer was a wiser man, and he recommended the Porte to seek some means of acceding to the entreaties of Mehemet Ali without compromising the dignity of the Sultan[[114]]. Baron Königsmark and M. Titow declined giving an opinion till they received further instructions[[115]].
On the 29th of March Rechid Pacha and Ahmed Fethi Pachi were displaced, and succeeded by Rifat Bey, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Tahir Pacha, as Capudan Pacha.
On the 31st March Prince Metternich, seeing no end to this question, instructed Baron Stürmer to inform the Divan, that if they did not adopt the modifications to the Firman recommended by the Conference of London, the Emperor of Austria would withdraw altogether from the alliance. Prince Metternich writes most strongly; he observes, “The contents of your despatch of the 17th of March attract our most serious attention, because they prove the existence of a position without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. What, for example, has been the result of the very precise instructions of the 30th of January? What attention have the Divan, and the agents of the Four Courts, paid to the opinion expressed in that document? On the one hand we see the Porte undecided as to the course which it will have to take on the subject of the representations of Mehemet Ali against certain articles of the Firman; and on the other, the Representatives of the Four Powers ignorant how to counsel from the very clear words of the Collective Note above mentioned; in truth, M. le Baron, it is impossible to make it out.” This is pretty strong language, which he follows up by saying, “The instructions I sent you on the 26th of March have replied, by anticipation, to your scruples, and I flatter myself you will have considered those instructions as anticipating the orders which each of you have applied for, and not have hesitated to offer the advice they contain.