As, during his captivity, Fauzi used to receive moneys from Cairo, he had, to explain his being able to live, to engage in some occupation, and took to lime-burning, a business which cost him more than he ever got out of it. As an Egyptian, he was under the surveillance of Youssef Mansour, who, after the escape of Slatin, refused to be responsible for Fauzi any longer. Failing to get him executed for having assisted in Slatin’s escape, he succeeded in getting him committed to the Saier, where he remained as a prisoner for four years, until released by the Sirdar.
APPENDIX V AHMED YOUSSEF KANDEEL
Ahmed Youssef Kandeel, though actually a civilian employé, held the rank in Khartoum, where he was born, of Lieutenant in the 3rd Soudan Artillery. He took part in many of the attacks on the dervishes during the siege, and fought with Bakhit Bey on the night the town was taken. He managed to fight his way to his house, and held out until the Mahdi’s orders came to stop the massacre of the inhabitants, when he gave himself up. His father, uncle, and brother had already been killed fighting. For some time he supported himself at Omdurman by cutting firewood, living in a state of semi-starvation. Being a good clerk, he offered his services to Wad Nejoumi, who, it appears, would employ no one but old Egyptian employés as “katibs” (clerks). He was with Wad Nejoumi when I was taken prisoner to Dongola, and throws an interesting light upon Nejoumi’s attitude towards Mahdieh, which more than confirms the impressions I had formed, and which I have given expression to in Chapter VI.: “Dongola to Omdurman.”
AHMED YOUSSEF KANDEEL.
Kandeel tells me that, on the arrival of our party at Dongola, Nejoumi called a meeting of emirs, and asked what should be done with us. All voted for instant execution, but this Nejoumi would not sanction. Among the emirs was a Taaishi wakil (spy or agent of Abdullahi)—a similar wakil being appointed to each army not actually led by one of the Khaleefa’s relatives. This wakil’s name was Messaad Geydoom-el-Taaishi. When Nejoumi insisted upon saving |347| my life, and, as an alternative, sending me to the Khaleefa, leaving him to decide what should be done with me, he instructed Kandeel to write a letter saying that, as I was a “hakeem” (doctor), I might be useful to him (Nejoumi) and also to the army. Geydoom, having his suspicions about Nejoumi’s loyalty to Mahdieh, used his sparing of my life as a proof of his sympathies with the Government, and Nejoumi was ordered to Omdurman, and kept a prisoner in his house for some months.
Geydoom’s treatment of the army during Nejoumi’s absence caused so much discontent that Abdullahi determined to send Nejoumi back to Dongola, but with strict instructions to at once commence the march for the conquest of Egypt. He was given a hundred and twenty rifles only, and very little ammunition.
When General Grenfell sent the letter to Nejoumi, calling upon him to surrender, Nejoumi called a council of emirs, said that the army could not possibly fight, as they were tired, hungry, and thirsty, and suggested surrender, for they must either be killed upon the field or die in the desert on the way back. The emirs, being of the Taaishi family, first accused Nejoumi of cowardice and then of treachery. They threatened to report him to the Khaleefa when the fight was won, and to ask that one of themselves should be given the command when the further advance into Egypt was ordered. There appears to be but little doubt that, had it not been for the Taaishi emirs, the army would have followed Nejoumi unarmed to the lines of the Government troops. The emirs dictated the reply which Nejoumi was to send to General Grenfell, and when Nejoumi dashed down into the plain as the dervish army was in retreat, it was doubtless with the object of reaching the Government lines, but under pretence of rallying the few remaining troops, so that they should not shoot him down if they thought he was deserting them—or follow him if they thought he was charging, for this would have drawn the fire of the brigades upon them. After the death of Nejoumi, spies reported to the Khaleefa that he had |348| attempted to open up negotiations with the Government troops, and Kandeel, being suspected as Nejoumi’s “katib,” was loaded with chains and sent to Omdurman, where he was imprisoned for fourteen months, and then released to become the clerk of Yacoub, the brother of Abdullahi.
APPENDIX VI THE SOUDAN: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
To the present generation the history of the Soudan may be said to commence with the date of its partial conquest by Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt. To go further back than this is to compile from various sources, all more or less inaccurate, a mass of information which, where not misleading, would be next to useless to the would-be correct historian. Even the recent history of the benighted country has from force of circumstances been compiled from sources not the most reliable, and it is extremely difficult for the moment to sift the facts from the legends. The Soudan is still an unknown and unconquered land. Small tribes have been magnified into nations, and petty chiefs and sheikhs into kings and sultans who evidenced their exalted position in the possession of a few more sheep, goats, donkeys, and slaves, than their neighbours. No single tribe or sheikh ever held general supremacy over the others; Zubeir was within an ace of making himself the Sultan of the Soudan, when he accepted an invitation to visit Cairo; that was twenty-five years ago, and he is still here. The Soudan was nothing more nor less than a collection of little commonwealths; occasionally a number of these would acknowledge allegiance to one particular headman, and, in such instances, the “nation” might have boasted almost as great a population as some small and obscure provincial town. But that such instances were rare |350| is proved by the facility with which Mohammad Ahmed and Abdullahi set the various sections of tribes fighting among themselves.