A history of England

by Charles Oman

Gibraltar taken by the English.

It was not in Bavaria alone that the English arms fared well in the year 1704. A fleet under Admiral Rooke and a small army had been sent to Spain, to help the Catalan malcontents, who were ready to rise in the name of the Archduke Charles. They were foiled before Barcelona, but on their return took by surprise the almost impregnable fortress of Gibraltar, a stronghold which has remained in English hands ever since. The possession of this place, "the Key of the Mediterranean," has proved invaluable in every subsequent war, enabling England to watch, and often to hinder, every attempt to bring into co-operation the eastern and the western fleets of France and Spain. Cadiz cannot communicate with Cartagena, or Toulon with Brest, without being observed from Gibraltar, and a strong English fleet based on that port can practically close the entrance of the Mediterranean.

The campaign of 1705.

In 1705 Marlborough had intended to attack France by the valley of the Moselle, but owing to the feeble help given by the Austrians—Prince Eugéne had been sent off to Italy—he was compelled to try a less adventurous scheme in the Spanish Netherlands. The armies of King Lewis, now under Marshal Villeroi, had ranged themselves in a long line from Antwerp to Namur, covering every assailable point with elaborate fortified lines. By a system of skilful feints and countermarches, Marlborough broke through the lines with the loss of only 80 men, and got possession of the plain of Brabant. He would have fought a pitched battle on the field of Waterloo, but for the reluctance of the Dutch Government, who wished to withdraw their troops at the critical moment, and prevented the campaign from being decisive.

1706.—Battle of Ramillies.

The next spring, however, brought Marlborough his reward. When he threatened the great fortress of Namur, Marshal Villeroi concentrated all the French troops in the Netherlands, and posted himself on the heights of Ramillies to cover the city. Marlborough's generalship was never better displayed than in the battle which ensued. Threatening the French left wing, he induced Villeroi to concentrate the stronger half of his army on that point. Then suddenly changing his order of attack, he flung himself on the extreme French right, and had taken Ramillies and stormed the heights behind it before Villeroi could hurry back his troops to the point of real danger. Each French brigade as it arrived was swept away by the advancing allies, and Villeroi lost his baggage and guns and half his army. The consequences of the fight were even more striking: Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and all Flanders and Hainault fell into Marlborough's hands. In the whole of the Spanish Netherlands, Lewis XIV. now held nothing but the two fortresses of Mons and Namur. The French frontier was laid open on a front of more than 200 miles.

French reverses in Italy and Spain.—Lewis XIV. sues for peace.

While the arms of France were faring so badly in the North, they were equally unsuccessful in the South. On September 6th of the same year, Prince Eugéne and the Duke of Savoy routed the French army of Italy in front of Turin; in consequence of this battle the generals of Lewis were obliged to evacuate the Milanese and Piedmont, and to retire behind the Alps. At the same time a second assault of the allies on Spain met with signal good fortune. The Catalans had risen in favour of the Archduke Charles, Barcelona had been stormed in 1705 by an Anglo-Austrian force under the Prince of Hesse, [49] and all Eastern Spain submitted. In 1706 an English force, reinforced by Portuguese, marched up to Madrid and seized it. It seemed that Philip V. would ere long be forced to leave Spain, and retire beyond the Pyrenees. The spirits of Lewis XIV. were so much dashed by this series of reverses that he, for the first time in his life, humbled himself to sue for peace from the allies—offering to waive his grandson's rights to Spain, Belgium, and the Indies, if he were allowed to keep the Spanish dominions in Italy—Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia.

1707.—Battle of Almanza.—Reverses of the allies.

The allies were unwise enough to reject these terms; Holland and the German states would have accepted them, but the Emperor was set on gaining the Milanese, and Marlborough, who loved the war for the wealth and glory that it brought him, persuaded the English Government to refuse to treat. This obstinate determination to push matters to extremity met with a well-deserved retribution. The fortune of war in 1707 commenced to turn against the allies. In Spain their army lost Madrid, and was almost annihilated at the battle of Almanza by the French and Spaniards. In consequence they lost all their foothold in the peninsula except Catalonia and Gibraltar. About the same time Eugéne of Savoy and the Austrians crossed the Alps and invaded Provence, but were beaten out of France after a disastrous failure before Toulon. Marlborough himself won no new successes in the Netherlands; the Austrians gave him little help, and his attention was distracted from Flanders by the enterprises of Charles XII. of Sweden. That brilliant and headstrong monarch, an old ally of France, had just invaded Germany from the rear, pursuing a quarrel with the Elector of Saxony. In great fear lest he might interfere in the war and join the French, Marlborough hastened to the far east, visited Charles at his camp in Saxony, and flattered and cajoled him into retiring. The Swede marched off into Poland, and Marlborough was able to return to Flanders with a quiet mind; but he had lost the best months of the campaigning season in his excursion to meet Charles.