There had of late been many changes in the persons who ruled England, but the policy of Pitt was still maintained by his successors. The old king, George III., had gone mad in 1810, and the nominal control of the country was now in the hands of his worthless, vicious son George, Prince of Wales, the old ally of the Whigs. But the regency was given him guarded with so many checks and limitations, that he was completely in the hands of the ministry, and could not do much harm. First Perceval, and after he had been shot by a lunatic in 1812, Robert Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, swayed the policy of England as prime minister. Both were men of moderate abilities and narrow minds, but they had the saving virtue of obstinacy, and stuck to the old policy of war with France through thick and thin. Their task was no easy one: debt was accumulating in appalling loads from the expenses of the war; the taxes were increased year by year; trade was much hampered by the Continental System; a series of bad harvests raised the cost of corn to famine-price, and led to endless discontent and rioting both in town and country; our allies were beaten one by one on the continent. There was no compensating gain save Wellington's successes in Spain, and the fact that we had now full control of the seas and had absorbed the colonial trade of the whole world. Yet the Tories hardened their hearts, and hammered away at "the Corsican Ogre" with untiring zeal. Nor can it be doubted for a moment that they were right; Napoleon had to be put down, or England must perish. All honour therefore to the men, narrow-minded and prejudiced though they were, who carried out the struggle to the bitter end.
Russia and the Continental System.
They were at last about to be rewarded for their perseverance. Towards the end of 1811 Napoleon became involved in a third struggle with Russia, more deadly than those of 1805 and 1806-7. The cause of the quarrel was the inevitable Continental System. Hitherto England had been the largest buyer of Russian goods, and Russia had been wont to get her luxuries and colonial wares from England. The enforced prohibition of trade with her best customer did Russia untold harm, and the Czar Alexander found that every class of his subjects was groaning under the yoke of the Berlin Decrees. Discontent was rife, and Alexander knew well enough that Russia is "a despotism tempered by assassination," and remembered the fate of his own father. He saw at last that his empire was losing more from alliance with Napoleon than she could lose by open war against him. Finally the Russian government began to provoke the Emperor by an almost overt neglect of his wishes, and practically abandoned the Continental System.
Napoleon's Russian campaign.
Napoleon was at the height of his arrogance and autocratic insolence. Instead of making an end to the war in Spain—"the running sore" as he called it, from the drain which it caused on his resources—he resolved to impose his will on Russia by force, and declared war upon the Czar. A vast army of 600,000 men was concentrated in eastern Germany, and crossed the Niemen in June, 1812. But the Russians had taken example by the policy by which Wellington had foiled Masséna in 1810: instead of fighting on their frontier, they withdrew into the heart of their vast plains, wasting the country behind them, and leaving no food for the invader. The French army had lost half its horses and a third of its men, before it approached Moscow or fought a serious engagement. The Russians turned to bay at Borodino, in front of their ancient capital; but Napoleon stormed their entrenchments at the cost of 25,000 men, and entered Moscow. But he found it deserted by its inhabitants, and a few days after his arrival the whole city was burnt, whether by the deliberate resolve of the Russians, or by the carelessness of the French soldiery. Winter was now at hand, and for want of food and shelter the Emperor resolved to retire on Poland. But the season was too late, and he was surprised on his way by the snow. His harassed and half-starved soldiers died by thousands on the roadside: the Russians cut off every straggler, and less than a tenth of the magnificent army that had crossed the Niemen struggled back to Germany (Nov. 1812-Jan. 1813).
Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos.
The fortune of war had at last turned, and Napoleon's first disaster was soon to be followed by his fall. Prussia and all his other unwilling subjects in northern Germany took arms when the fate of the "Grande Armée" became known, and to meet them the Emperor had to call up his last reserves of men, and especially to draw on the large force in the Spanish peninsula. But he found that little help could come from Spain, for 1812 had been as fatal to his marshals in the south as to himself in the far north. Early in the year Wellington had swooped down on Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, the two fortresses in French hands which covered the Spanish frontier. He stormed each of them after a siege of a few days, making the desperate courage of his soldiery serve instead of a long bombardment, and paying for his rapid success by a heavy loss of men. Badajos was actually escaladed with ladders, the breaches having proved inaccessible. The French marshals came hurrying up to save their strongholds, but found them already fallen into English hands.
Battle of Salamanca.
There followed the decisive battle of Salamanca, in which Wellington defeated Marshal Marmont, and crushed the main army of the enemy. This fight was a splendid exhibition of his skill: his able adversary had for a moment put his left wing in a hazardous position. Before half an hour had elapsed, Wellington had pounced upon the isolated divisions, routed them, and attacked and scattered the main body. Thus, as was happily said, he "beat forty thousand men in forty minutes." In consequence of this victory Wellington was able to retake Madrid, after it had been four years in hostile hands. To check his further success the French marshals had to evacuate all southern and central Spain, and mass their forces against the victor. When they beset him with 100,000 men he was forced to retreat towards the Portuguese frontier for a space. But the net result of the campaign had been to deliver Andalusia and most of Castile from the enemy, and more was to follow. Napoleon had to withdraw so many of his veterans from Spain, to replace his losses in the Russian war, that in the next spring Wellington was no longer in his wonted inferiority of numbers. He used his opportunity with his usual skill and promptness.
Battle of Vittoria.—Last efforts of the French in Spain.