[73] So called because it was originally supposed to take the fifth man.
[74] The successful and opportune charge of the regimiento del Rey at Talavera was about the only case which ever came under English eyes.
[75] Napoleon had an ideal proportion of five guns per 1,000 men. But, as we shall show in the next chapter, while dealing with the French armies, he never succeeded in reaching anything like this standard in the Peninsula. Yet his opponents were always worse off.
[76] These last were the rear battalions of the unfortunate Portuguese legion which was in march for the Baltic; they were still on this side of the Pyrenees when the war began, and were hastily utilized against Saragossa.
[77] French generals were much addicted to the pernicious practice of massing the grenadier companies of all the regiments of a division, or an army corps, in order to make a picked battalion or brigade, to be used as a reserve. Junot had four such battalions (grenadiers réunis) at Vimiero, and Victor three at Barossa.
[78] To take a later example, of the three corps d’armée (II, VI, VIII) with which Masséna invaded Portugal in 1810, there were only three regiments with four battalions present; while seventeen had three, eight had two, and ten a single battalion only.
[79] Nodier, Souvenirs de la Révolution, ii. 233-5.
[80] In the campaign of 1810 the 26th, 66th, and 82nd regiments in Masséna’s army had 5th and 6th battalions in the field.
[81] This was done on July 7 (see Nap. Corresp., 14,164). Nos. 1 and 2 became the 114th of the line, 3 and 4 the 115th, 5 and 6 the 116th, 7 and 8 the 33rd léger, 9 and 10 the 117th, 11 the 118th, 13 and 14 the 119th, 17 and 18 the 120th. When the 6th, 7th, and 8th were captured at Baylen, new conscripts had to be brought from France to complete the 116th and replace the 33rd léger.
[82] See Rousset’s excellent La Grande Armée de 1813.