[547] I know no better way of displaying the Napoleonesque method than the printing opposite each other of his dispatches 14,620 and 14,626, both addressed to Joseph Bonaparte. For the benefit of the newspapers the English army was to be overstated by 10,000 or 12,000 men!
| 14,620. | 14,626. | |
| Faites mettre dans les journaux et répandre partout que 36,000 Anglais sont cernés. Je suis sur leurs derrières tandis que le maréchal Soult est devant eux. | Leur force réelle est de 20,000 à 21,000 infanterie, et de 4,000 à 5,000 de cavalerie avec une quarantaine de pièces de canon. |
[548] Castlereagh to Dalrymple, Sept. 2, 1808: ‘As circumstances may come to your knowledge which might render the immediate employment of your disposable forces in the north of Spain of the utmost importance to the common cause, without waiting for orders from hence, I am to inform you that you should not consider the present instructions as depriving you of the latitude of discretion which you now possess, without waiting for express orders from hence.’
[550] See [p. 283], dealing with the garrison of Elvas.
[551] Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Sept. 27.
[552] Moore to Castlereagh from Lisbon, Oct. 9, 1808.
[553] The very interesting (and sometimes very sensible) replies of Castaños to Bentinck will be found in the latter’s letter to Dalrymple (Oct. 2).
[554] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Dec. 10, 1808.
[555] A good account of the difficulties of transport in Moore’s army will be found in Quartermaster Surtees’s Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade. Placed in charge of the baggage and beasts of the 2/95th, he found it absolutely impossible to keep the native drivers from absconding, even when they had to sacrifice their beasts to do so (pages 81-82).