[308] This is shown by a letter of March 23 from Solignac, one of Lapisse’s brigadiers, which was intercepted by guerrillas. The general writes to his friend Raguerie that the march on Abrantes is certain, and that letters for him had better be readdressed to Lisbon [Record Office].
[309] Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 189, show that he and Joseph authorized the move, at Victor’s instance, and prove that it was not made on Lapisse’s own responsibility, as Napier supposes [ii. 72], but in obedience to superior orders.
[310] This narrative is from Mayne and Lillie, supplemented by Jourdan and other French sources. Wilson thought that he had foiled a real attack on Rodrigo, but was mistaken: Lapisse was only feinting.
[311] It is impossible to make out why Alcantara was treated so much worse than other places taken by storm, but the facts are well vouched for. The report of the local authorities to Cuesta says that not only all peasants taken with arms in their hands, but more than forty non-combatants were butchered, and that not a woman who had remained in the place escaped rape. Lillie, the historian of the Lusitanian Legion, who was with the force that pursued Lapisse from Rodrigo, says that he saw the traces of ‘acts of barbarity that would disgrace the most savage and uncivilized of mankind’—corpses deliberately mutilated and laid out to roast on piles of burning furniture, with the bodies of domestic animals, such as pigs and dogs, placed on the top of the pile as if in jest [Lusitanian Legion, pp. 66-7]. The German historian Schepeler gives very similar details, adding the note about the dragging up of bones and coffins from the churches.
[312] All Napier’s criticism (ii. 85-6) on Lapisse’s movement to Alcantara is vitiated by his ignorance of the fact that Jourdan and the King, at Victor’s instance, had sent him orders to go there. But nothing can excuse his previous inaction in February and March. He ought to have attacked Rodrigo before the end of January, when it was still almost without a garrison, and in a state of great disrepair.
[314] Napier’s ‘Colonel Barrois.’
[315] Most of these details as to the fall of Vigo come from a contemporary account in Andrade’s collection, printed in Los Guerrilleros Gallegos, pp. 129-37. Le Noble asserts that only 794 men were captured, but Captain Mackinley says that he received nearly 1,300 prisoners, including 300 sick and many non-combatants. He had the best opportunities of knowing, and must be followed. Le Noble and the Spaniards do not give the French commander’s name, but I find that of Chalot as the senior officer among the prisoners in the list in the Record Office. Next to him is the paymaster-general Conscience. Toreno and Schepeler agree with Captain Mackinley in giving the number of the prisoners at over 1,200.
[316] Le Noble, though he mentions the formation of the legion (p. 120), omits to state that it was left at Chaves. But St. Chamans establishes this fact (p. 120); he calls the corps ‘les Espagnols et Portugais qui se disaient de notre parti.’ Des Odoards (p. 212) also speaks of the ‘legion,’ as does Naylies (p. 81). Its existence explains both the feebleness of Messager’s defence, and the large number of prisoners whom Silveira captured. The fighting force of the garrison was only the one company, plus some hundreds of convalescents, who in the fortnight since Soult’s departure had been able to resume their arms.
[317] Silveira to Beresford (Record Office). Cf. Foy’s dispatch to Loison (April 19), in which he owns that he failed to hold the convent, and retired with a loss of ninety-one men of the 17th regiment.