[454] See [p. 321].

[455] ‘In respect to Soult, I shall omit nothing that I can do to destroy him—but I am afraid that with the force I have at my disposal, it is not in my power to prevent him retreating into Spain.’ Wellesley to Frere, May 9, 1809.

[456] From Montalegre, May 18, 1809.

[457] i.e. its sick and wounded.

[458] Napier, Arteche, and Schepeler all agree in this, the former only making the excuse that Silveira may not have fully understood Beresford’s orders, owing to the difficulty of language. But Beresford spoke and wrote Portuguese fluently.

[459] See [p. 192].

[460] Napoleon to Ney, from Paris, Feb. 18, 1809.

[461] ‘Ne comptez sur aucun renfort: croyez plutôt qu’on pourrait être dans le cas de porter ailleurs une de vos divisions.’

[462] Acevedo’s division, deducting the regular troops [Hibernia (two batts.), and Provincial of Oviedo], had some 6,000 men: while 5,200 remained behind in Asturias. See pp. 632 and 637 of vol. i.

[463] Apparently consisting in February of three battalions and a Spanish Legion which Napoleon had organized out of the prisoners of Blake’s and La Romana’s armies: 2,998 men in all. The Legion waited till it had received arms and clothing, and then deserted en masse and went to join the insurgents. For angry correspondence on this incident see Napoleon to King Joseph, Feb. 20, and King Joseph to Napoleon, March 7, 1809.