[555] June 10, Joseph to Napoleon.
[556] Cf. Joseph’s letters of June 10 and June 16 to Napoleon: but there seems to be much vacillation in his decisions.
[557] Cuesta’s replies, sent on by Bourke, are dated June 4 and June 6, i.e. ten and eight days respectively before Victor began his retreat beyond the Tagus on June 14.
[558] Wellesley writes in commenting on this plan [Wellington Dispatches, iv. 402]: ‘At all events these two detachments on the two flanks appear to me to be too weak to produce any great effect upon the movements of Victor.... I think it would be nearly certain that the Marshal would be able to defend the passage [of the Tagus] with a part only of his force, while with the other part he would beat one or both of the detachments sent round his flank. Indeed the detachment which should have been sent from La Serena toward Talavera, being between the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, could hardly escape.’ Wellesley also points out that it is useless to expect that Victor would wait in his present cantonments: at the first news of the approach of the British army he will retire to Almaraz and Arzobispo.
[559] I print as an Appendix this all-important letter to Bourke, regarding Cuesta’s three plans of campaign.
[560] Wellesley to Bourke, from Abrantes, June 14.
[561] Wellesley to Cuesta, from Abrantes, June 14.
[562] Wellesley to Castlereagh, Abrantes, June 17. The real cause of Cuesta’s angry and impracticable attitude will be shown in the next chapter.
[563] Wellesley to Frere from the same place, June 14.
[564] With regard to these regiments [5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th], Wellesley writes in very bitter terms to Donkin on June 16, saying that the number of their stragglers was scandalous, and that the laggards were committing all manner of disorders in the rear of the army. It is fair to remember that the battalions had suffered exceptional hardships, as may be seen from the narratives of Gough of the 87th, and Grattan of the 88th.