[595] Soult had written [from Puebla de Senabria, June 25]: ‘Je me propose de reposer les troupes trois ou quatre jours: pendant ce temps elles se prépareront des subsistances, on raccommodera la chaussure, les chevaux seront ferrés, et je menacerai de nouveau le Portugal: peut-être même je ferai faire une incursion vers Bragance, afin d’opérer une diversion qui ne peut pas manquer de produire quelque effet.... Je me fais précéder à Zamora (où je compte être rendu le 2 juillet) par l’ordonnateur Le Noble, qui doit réclamer près l’intendant-général de l’armée des moyens en tout genre qui me manquent—tel que l’habillement, chaussure, ambulance, officiers de santé, administration, transport militaire, payeurs, argent pour solde et dépenses extraordinaires, postes etc. J’ai l’honneur de supplier Votre Majesté de daigner donner des ordres pour qu’il soit fait droit a ses demandes: mes besoins sont très grands.... Il y a plus de cinq mois que je n’ai reçu ni ordre, ni nouvelle, ni secours, par conséquent je dois manquer de beaucoup de choses.’
[596] Wellesley’s views at this moment appear in his correspondence, e.g. to Mr. Villiers, July 8: ‘I defy Soult to do Beresford or Portugal any injury as long as his army is in its present situation—or any amelioration of that situation which can be produced in a short period of time.’ To Beresford, July 9: ‘I have no apprehension that Soult will be able to do anything with his corps for some time, but I think that column ought to be watched.’ To Beresford, July 14: ‘I do not believe that Ney has quitted Galicia, at least we have not heard that he has. Soult can do nothing against Portugal, for he is in a most miserable state, without arms, artillery or ammunition, stores, &c.’
[597] Wellesley to Beresford, July 9: ‘I have not forgotten either the Puerto de Baños or the Puerto de Perales, and have called upon Cuesta to occupy both. The former is already held, and the latter will be so in a day or two.’ [This was unfortunately not to be the case.]
[598] I cannot discover the names of the two very weak battalions, the smallest in Cuesta’s army, which were detached for this purpose under Del Reino. They are not the same as the two battalions which joined Wilson (Merida and 3rd of Seville).
[599] Wellesley to Frere, July 13: ‘You will see, in the accompanying letter, an account of my endeavour to prevail on General Cuesta to make a detachment upon Avila. I agree with you that it would be a great advantage from a military point of view ... but I must at the same time inform you that I do not consider the movement to be necessary as a military measure.’ Frere and Wellesley had hoped that Albuquerque might be placed in command of this large detachment, and might distinguish himself at its head.
[600] Battalions of Merida (1,170 bayonets) and 3rd of Seville (810 bayonets).
[601] All these details as to the joint plan are better expressed in Cuesta’s Apologetic Manifesto, published after his resignation, than in Wellesley’s Dispatches to Castlereagh and Frere.
[602] Cuesta’s and Wellesley’s accounts of their joint plan on the whole agree wonderfully well.
[603] See Wellington to Castlereagh, from Ramalhal, Sept. 1808.
[604] ‘The general sentiment of the army appears to be contempt for the Junta and the present form of government, great confidence in Cuesta, and a belief that he is too powerful for the Junta, and will overturn that government. This sentiment appears to be so general that I conceive that the Duke of Albuquerque must entertain it equally with others: but I have not seen him.’ Wellesley to Frere from Plasencia, July 13.