[107] He then pushed on to Cadiz, where he was on the 6th-7th, spent a night at Seville again on the 9th-10th, and was back at Badajoz on the 11th of November. At Cadiz he parted with his brother, who was just embarking for England, to take up his place in the new Ministry.
[108] As late as Oct. 28 he had written to Colonel Roche, the British officer attached to the staff of the Army of the Centre, to beg him to press on the newly-arrived Areizaga the necessity of adopting a defensive posture, and risking nothing. From the wording of the letter it is clear that no hint of the orders sent to Areizaga from Seville had reached Badajoz. Wellington Dispatches, v. 248-9, see also the dispatch to Castlereagh on p. 267.
[109] See Wellington to Roche, and to B. Frère, Badajoz, Nov. 19. Dispatches, v. 292-3 and 294.
[110] ‘Nothing can save them save a victory by Areizaga, and the possession of Madrid, which are the most improbable of events.... If Del Parque and Albuquerque are destroyed, which is not unlikely, indeed pretty certain ... we must make our arrangements for the defence of Portugal.’ Wellington to Beresford, Nov. 20, 1809.
[111] Wellington’s arguments must be culled from his various dispatches to Lord Liverpool and other ministers in November and December 1809. For the first of the motives quoted above see Wellington to Liverpool Dec. 9. ‘The object in occupying this proposed position [in Beira] is to be at the point of the defence of Portugal, to divert the attention of the French from the South of Spain, when they shall receive their reinforcements, and thus to give time to the Spanish Government to repair their losses.... It is absolutely necessary to cross the Tagus immediately, as it may be depended upon that the enemy’s first effort, after receiving his reinforcements, will be upon the troops to the North of the Tagus.’ Very much the same opinion is expressed in the earlier dispatch to Lord Liverpool of November 14. Expressions of Wellington’s conviction that it was impossible to co-operate with the Junta or the Spanish generals may be found passim in all his confidential letters. See for example that to Sir J. Anstruther, pp. 386-8 of Supplementary Dispatches, vol. vi.
[112] The papers in the Madrid archives show that Copons had about 3,000 men, Zerain (whose division had been almost entirely destroyed) about 1,500.
[113] See vol. ii. pp. 168-9.
[115] For a typical example of the relations of French governors and the King’s officials see Thiébault’s account of his quarrel with Amoros in his autobiography, iv. 350-5. Cf. Miot de Melito, chapters xi-xii of vol. ii.
[116] Miot de Melito, ii. p. 351.