[36] Not in the Correspondance, but in the form of a letter from Berthier to Soult, which Soult answers at great length in his Dispatch from Seville of December 1.

[37] ‘Le 5e Corps, au lieu de suivre La Romana, et par là de menacer la rive gauche du Tage vis-à-vis de Lisbonne (pour empêcher les Anglais d’avoir toutes leurs forces sur la rive droite), s’est replié honteusement sur Séville.’ Correspondance, no. 17,131.

[38] Soult to Berthier, no. 24 in Appendix to Belmas, vol. i. p. 472.

[39] The total of the troops available against Mortier in December would have been, giving net totals, with sick and detached men all deducted:—

Spanish:
Ballasteros’s Division5,000
Mendizabal’s Division6,000
Permanent garrison of Badajoz4,200
5 battalions left behind by La Romana at Albuquerque, Olivenza, &c.2,000
Carlos de España’s brigade on the Tagus near Abrantes1,500
Cavalry of the Army of Estremadura2,600
Artillery500
Portuguese:
Brigade of Line Regiments, Nos. 5 and 17, at Elvas2,500
Brigade of Cavalry under Madden, 3rd, 5th, 8th regiments950
Hamilton’s Division (with Hill), 2nd, 4th, 10th, 14th Line4,800
Portuguese Militia, 4 regiments, Beja, Evora, Villa Viciosa, Portalegre, in Elvas, Jerumenha, and Campo Mayor4,000
5th Caçadores (with Hill)450
Fane’s Cavalry (with Hill), 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th regiments1,200
Artillery (4 batteries)600
British:
Hill’s Second Division5,250
13th Light Dragoons350
Artillery (3 batteries)400
Total42,300

Mortier had in the 5th Corps 11,500 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and about 700 artillery in his 7 batteries.

[40] Soult to Berthier, December 1, 1810, from Seville.

[41] This dispatch of March 29 (Nap. Corresp., no. 17,531), which must have reached Soult about the end of April, when Masséna had long retired to Spain, told him that he should have withdrawn all the 4th Corps from Granada save the six Polish battalions, and have drawn in Godinot’s brigade from Cordova, i. e. have abandoned the whole eastern half of Andalusia, and have tried to hold nothing but the siege lines of Cadiz and the city of Seville. But this was ‘wisdom after the event.’ In December Napoleon was harping upon a diversion with 10,000 men to Montalvão and Villaflor, not ordering the evacuation of the greater part of Andalusia.

[42] January 25, Napoleon to Berthier, ‘Il est nécessaire d’écrire au duc de Dalmatie qu’après la prise de Badajoz il doit se porter sur le Tage, avec son équipage de pont, et donner les moyens au prince d’Essling d’assiéger et prendre Abrantès.’ Correspondance, no. 17,295.

February 5, Napoleon to Berthier, ‘Écrivez au duc d’Istrie (Bessières, now commanding the new “Army of the North”) ... que tout paraît prendre une couleur avantageuse, que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le duc de Dalmatie a pu se porter sur le Tage.’ [Unfortunately Badajoz did not surrender till March 11, and Soult was extremely lucky to get it so early.] Correspondance, no. 17,335.