[243] We cannot say ‘four British battalions,’ for two of them were foreign corps, the Chasseurs Britanniques and the Brunswick Oels Light Infantry. The two line regiments were the 51st and 85th.
[244] 7th and 19th Line and 2nd Caçadores, forming Collins’s brigade.
[245] viz. 2/88th for 3rd Division, 2/52nd for Light Division, 1/36th for the 6th Division.
[246] Including Pack’s whole brigade.
[247] Details may be verified in Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiii. p. 611.
[248] Wellington’s orders were to cross 2 miles at least above Sabugal. The actual crossing was only 1¼ miles above.
[249] This fact comes from a MS. note by Sir John Bell of the 52nd, in my possession. He writes: ‘Just as the 2nd Brigade changed its direction, the General, being at some distance, sent an order for it not to engage. But the staff officer who carried it, and Drummond, seeing how matters stood, took the liberty of forgetting the message, so that Beckwith should have the full benefit of the support at hand. No question was ever asked as to the non-delivery of the order.’
[250] This statement is made by Tomkinson in his diary on April 3, p. 94.
[251] Many details in this narrative of the combat of Sabugal will be found to differ from those given in earlier histories. I have been relying for the French movements largely on the life of General Merle, the officer who was in charge of most of the fighting, and had the best chance of giving a correct story. [Braquehay’s Le Général Merle, pp. 160-1.]
[252] See the tables of the French and British losses in [Appendix No. VI]. Fririon, as chief of the staff, must have seen and passed the French return giving 750 casualties, yet in his narrative allows for only 250, saying, ‘On a beaucoup exagéré les pertes: les chiffres que nous donnons sont très exacts.’ This is only one example of his habit of falsifying figures, in which he rivalled Masséna and Soult.