[283] ‘Le Portugal est trop loin: je ne peux pas y aller; il faudrait six mois. Pendant six mois tout est suspendu: l’Europe est sans direction: les Russes peuvent se déclarer, les Anglais débarquer au nord. En vérité, quand on voit la différence qu’un homme met aux événements, il est impossible de ne pas avoir de l’amour propre.’ 30th March, 1811. Napoleon’s interview with Foy, reported by the latter in Vie Militaire du Général Foy, p. 140.

[284] For a similar hint of danger in 1809, see above, vol. i. pp. 560-61.

[285] Sometimes on absolutely false information, due to the Emperor’s vast distance from the theatre of war leading him to make hypotheses which had been falsified, because of the mistaken premises on which he grounded them. For example, on March 30, 1811, he told Berthier that Masséna’s head quarters were at Coimbra, and that a detachment of his army occupied Oporto, and these ‘news’ were to be sent on to Soult (Correspondance, 17,531). On that day Masséna was already behind the Coa on his retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo.

[286] Compare the dispatches of March 30, where it is demonstrated that Soult has nothing to fear for Badajoz, because Wellington cannot detach more than 15,000 men against it, and that of December 12, where it is demonstrated that Soult having 80,000 men should be ashamed of himself for allowing the ‘affront’ of Arroyo dos Molinos to be put upon him by Hill and 6,000 British.

[287] ‘Il ne faut pas se diviser: il faut réunir ses forces, présenter des masses imposantes: toutes les troupes qu’on laisse en arrière courent le risque d’être battues en détail, ou forcées d’abandonner les postes,’ &c. Napoleon to Soult, Correspondance, December 6, 1811.

[288] Napoleon to Berthier; orders for Bessières and Marmont of May 26, 1811.

[289] See Correspondance, 17,784, Napoleon to Clarke, 8th June, 1811. The divisions were composed as follows:—

Souham. 1st Line (4 batts.) and 62nd Line (4 batts.), from Turin and Marseilles; 23rd Léger (2 batts.), from Auxonne; 101st Line (4 batts.), from Turin and Spezzia. About 7,000 men.

Caffarelli. 5th Léger (2 batts.), from Cherbourg; 3rd and 105th Line (each 2 batts.), from Rennes; 10th Léger (4 batts.), from Rennes; 52nd Line (2 batts.), from Toulon. About 6,000 men.

Reille. 81st Line (2 batts. at Pampeluna, 1 from Genoa); 10th Line and 20th Line (4 batts. each), already at Pampeluna; 60th Line (4 batts.), from Toulon. About 7,500 men.