[369] ‘Le désir que l’armée a manifesté depuis longtemps d’aller se reposer ne me laisse aucun doute qu’il serait dangereux d’attendre l’ennemi pour recevoir bataille ou pour la lui donner.’
[370] All this, of course, is from the Great Memorandum of March 30, which Berthier was to communicate to all the chiefs of the Peninsular armies.
[371] For all this see section xxvi. pp. [279-81], on Beresford’s campaign in Estremadura.
[373] That he did not purpose to be longer away is shown by the fact that he was already at Portalegre, on his return journey from Elvas, when Spencer’s final warning that Masséna was on the move reached him. Dispatches, vii. 50.
[374] See the three dispatches to Spencer on pp. 464-6, 473-4, and 475 of Dispatches, vii, dated respectively April 14, April 16, and April 17, 1811.
[375] For details see the Journal of George Simmons of the 95th (A British Rifleman), pp. 164-5.
[376] Wrongly dated April 20 by Sprünglin in his generally accurate diary (p. 477).
[377] Thiébault’s Mémoires, vol. iv. p. 448.
[378] The 6th Corps incorporated one battalion each of the 6th Léger, 25th Léger, and the 27th Ligne from Conroux’s division, and one each of the 39th, 59th, 69th, 76th from Claparéde’s. The 2nd Corps got a battalion of the 17th Léger only, besides drafts. Solignac’s division, nominally 6,110 bayonets, was short of two battalions (from the 15th and 65th), or 850 men, left in garrison at Ciudad Rodrigo. In the same garrison had been left the whole Régiment de Prusse (500 men), besides drafts. The junction of the isolated battalions from Drouet’s corps took place on April 27. (Fririon, p. 198.)