[572] The loss was 8 killed, 1 officer and 20 men wounded, 1 officer and 35 men unwounded prisoners.

[573] There are two good accounts of this skirmish near Quinta de Gremezia, one in a letter by Captain von Stolzenburg of the hussars (in Schwertfeger’s History of the K.G.L., ii. 247), the other by George Farmer, a trooper of the 11th Light Dragoons, whose little autobiography was published by Gleig in 1844, under the title of The Light Dragoon, see vol. i. pp. 92-7. Farmer says that the French dragoons in their rear were taken at first for Portuguese squadrons coming up from Elvas to reinforce the line.

[574] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, viii. p. 58.

[575] Wellington to Erskine (then commanding the cavalry division to which the 11th belonged), June 22. Dispatches, viii. p. 40.

[576] They exist in the D’Urban papers, though not printed in the Wellington dispatches, and fall into three sections: What is to be done if the French attack (1) the left (near Campo Mayor); (2) the centre (along the Caya); (3) the right (by Elvas).

[577] This description of the allied position differs, it may be noted, from Napier’s (iii. p. 314), where it is said that the 1st Division was retained at Portalegre as a general reserve. I think that this is an error for the 5th Division—perhaps a printer’s error perpetuated through many editions—like some others in his great work. For the journals of the Guards’ brigade of the 1st Division (Stothert, p. 259; Stepney, p. 130) show that it left Portalegre on the 19th, and was at Santa Olalla near Elvas on the 23rd. Oddly enough, Lord Londonderry makes the same mistake (ii. 170), saying that Spencer was kept back at Portalegre with his whole corps (i. e. the 1st, 5th, 6th Divisions). Gomm’s diary (p. 226) vouches for the 5th and 6th being near Portalegre on the 24th.

[578] The last morning states of the army, those of mid June, give a total for the British of 1,843 officers and 33,205 men of all arms fit for service. Roughly the details are: Cavalry, 3,600; 1st Division, 5,000; 2nd Division, 4,100; 3rd Division, 3,300; 4th Division, 3,300; 5th Division, 3,200; 6th Division, 3,100; 7th Division (including Alten’s brigade), 3,000; Light Division, 2,900; Artillery, Engineers, &c., 2,300. Portuguese units: three weak cavalry brigades (Madden, Otway, Barbaçena), 1,400; nine and a half infantry brigades (Ashworth, Pack, Power, Spry, Collins, Campbell, Fonseca, Harvey, Coleman, and Elder’s Caçadores) varying from 1,500 to 2,200 bayonets, 17,000; Artillery, 800. I cannot understand Napier’s statement that there were only 14,000 Portuguese present, 17,000 seeming the lowest possible figure. Wellington (to Lord Liverpool, June 24) says that he has 41,000 effective rank and file of infantry; adding (as usual) one-eighth more for officers, sergeants, and staff, we get 46,000 total for infantry. Now 29,000 being certainly British (as by return above) there must be 17,000 Portuguese of all ranks, which tallies with the figure above. The artillery details are from the Dickson Papers, ed. Leslie, i. p. 407. D’Urban, under July 15th (when a regiment or two, e. g. the 68th, had joined from Lisbon), says that the allied total of rank and file was: Infantry, 44,600; Cavalry, 4,200; Artillery, 2,200 = 51,000 in all, or adding officers and sergeants, &c., about 57,500. This seems a high estimate for the infantry, but low for the cavalry and artillery.

[579] All these details are set out in full in the orders copied in D’Urban’s diary.

[580] These two noteworthy dispatches are accessible in the Appendix to vol. i of Belmas, to those who have not time to visit the Paris Archives.

[581] vol. iii. p. 316.