| SECTION XXIII | ||
| The Winter Campaign of 1810-11 | ||
| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
| [I.] | Masséna at Santarem. The deadlock on the Lower Tagus. December 1810-January 1811 | [1] |
| [II.] | Soult’s Invasion of Estremadura. January-March 1811. The Battle of the Gebora and the Fall of Badajoz | [23] |
| [III.] | Masséna’s Last Weeks at Santarem. January-March 1811 | [64] |
| [IV.] | Events in the South of Spain. The Battle of Barrosa. January-March 1811 | [91] |
| SECTION XXIV | ||
| Masséna’s Retreat from Portugal | ||
| [I.] | Santarem to Celorico. March 9th-22nd, 1811 | [131] |
| [II.] | Guarda and Sabugal. March 22nd-April 12th, 1811 | [173] |
| SECTION XXV | ||
| Events in Northern, Eastern, and Central Spain | ||
| [I.] | King Joseph and his Troubles | [206] |
| [II.] | Suchet on the Ebro. The Fall of Tortosa. December 1810-March 1811 | [227] |
| SECTION XXVI | ||
| Fuentes de Oñoro and Albuera | ||
| [I.] | Beresford’s Campaign in Estremadura. The First British Siege of Badajoz. March-May 1811 | [247] |
| [II.] | Fuentes de Oñoro: Preliminary Operations. April 12th-May 3rd, 1811 | [288] |
| [III.] | The Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro. May 5th, 1811 | [315] |
| [IV.] | Brennier’s Escape from Almeida. May 1811 | [349] |
| [V.] | The Battle of Albuera. May 16th, 1811 | [363] |
| SECTION XXVII | ||
| Wellington’s First Estremaduran Campaign | ||
| [I.] | The Second British Siege of Badajoz. May-June 1811 | [404] |
| [II.] | Wellington on the Caya. June-July 1811 | [443] |
| [III.] | Events in the North of Spain during the concentration on the Caya. Dorsenne and the Galicians. June-August 1811 | [461] |
| [IV.] | Soult’s Troubles in Andalusia, July-September 1811 | [475] |
| SECTION XXVIII | ||
| Operations in Eastern Spain in the Spring, Summer, and Autumn of 1811 | ||
| [I.] | Figueras and Tarragona. April-May 1811 | [484] |
| [II.] | The Siege and Fall of Tarragona. May-June 1811 | [497] |
| [III.] | The Fall of Figueras and the Autumn Campaign in Catalonia. July-October 1811 | [528] |
| SECTION XXIX | ||
| Wellington’s Autumn Campaign of 1811 | ||
| [I.] | Wellington’s Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. August-September 1811 | [542] |
| [II.] | El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte. September 1811 | [559] |
| [III.] | The End of Wellington’s Campaigns of 1811. Arroyo dos Molinos. September 1811 | [583] |
| APPENDICES | ||
| [I.] | The French Army in Portugal, Returns of January-April 1811 | [608] |
| [II.] | Soult’s Army in his First Expedition to Estremadura, January-March 1811 | [610] |
| [III.] | Spanish Troops in Estremadura, March 1811 | [610] |
| [IV.] | Graham’s Army at Barrosa, and its Losses | [612] |
| [V.] | Victor’s Army at Barrosa, and its Losses | [613] |
| [VI]-[VII]. | British Losses at Pombal, Redinha, Casal Novo, Foz do Arouce, and Sabugal, March-April 1811 | [614]-[616] |
| [VIII.] | French Losses at Sabugal, April 3rd, 1811 | [617] |
| [IX.] | Force of Wellington’s Army at Fuentes de Oñoro, May 3-5, 1811 | [618] |
| [X.] | British and Portuguese Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro, First Day, May 3 | [622] |
| [XI.] | British and Portuguese Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro, Second Day, May 5th, 1811 | [623] |
| [XII.] | The French Army at Fuentes de Oñoro | [625] |
| [XIII.] | Masséna’s Orders for Fuentes de Oñoro | [629] |
| [XIV.] | French Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro | [630] |
| [XV.] | The Allied Army at Albuera, and its Losses, May 16, 1811 | [631] |
| [XVI.] | Soult’s Army at Albuera, and its Losses | [634] |
| [XVII.] | Strength of the Spanish Armies in the Summer of 1811 | [636] |
| [XVIII.] | Strength of the French Army in Spain, July 15, 1811 | [638] |
| [XIX.] | French and Spanish Forces at the Siege of Tarragona | [643] |
| [XX.] | Wellington’s Army on the Beira Frontier, September 15 | [644] |
| [XXI.] | Allied Losses at the Combat of El Bodon | [648] |
| [XXII.] | Allied Losses at the Combat of Aldea da Ponte | [648] |
| [XXIII.] | Hill’s Force in Estremadura, September-October 1811 | [649] |
| [XXIV.] | The British Artillery in the Peninsula during the Campaign of 1811 | [650] |
| [INDEX] | [653] | |
| MAPS AND PLANS | |||
| PAGE | |||
| [I.] | Badajoz and the Battle of the Gebora | To face | [54] |
| [II.] | General Map of the Barrosa Campaign | ” | [104] |
| [III.] | The Battle of Barrosa | ” | [124] |
| [IV.] | Combat of Redinha | ” | [144] |
| [V.] | Combat of Casal Novo | ” | [152] |
| [VI.] | Combat of Foz do Arouce | ” | [158] |
| [VII.] | Masséna’s Retreat. Leiria to the Alva River | ” | [166] |
| [VIII.] | Combat of Sabugal | ” | [196] |
| [IX.] | Masséna’s Retreat. Celorico to Ciudad Rodrigo | ” | [200] |
| [X.] | Plan of the Siege of Tortosa | ” | [238] |
| [XI.] | The British Sieges of Badajoz in May and June 1811 | ” | [286] |
| XII. | Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro (two plates) | ” | [316], [338] |
| XIII. | Battle of Albuera (two plates) | ” | [384], [394] |
| [XIV.] | General Map of Estremadura | ” | [452] |
| [XV.] | Plan of the Siege of Tarragona | ” | [524] |
| [XVI.] | General Map of Catalonia | ” | [538] |
| ILLUSTRATIONS | ||
| PAGE | ||
| Portrait of General Picton | [Frontispiece] | |
| Portrait of General Graham | To face | [96] |
| Portrait of Marshal Beresford | ” | [260] |
| British Army crossing the Tagus at Villa Velha | ” | [408] |
| Fort San Cristobal | ” | [424] |
SECTION XXIII
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1810-11
CHAPTER I
MASSÉNA AT SANTAREM. THE DEADLOCK ON THE LOWER TAGUS. DECEMBER 1810-JANUARY 1811
On the 18th of November, 1810, Masséna had completed the movement to the rear which he had commenced on the 14th. His army no longer threatened the Lines of Torres Vedras: he had abandoned the offensive for the defensive. Concentrated in the triangle Santarem-Punhete-Thomar, with his three corps so disposed that a march of twenty miles would suffice to concentrate everything save outlying detachments, he waited to see whether his enemy would dare to attack him; for he still hoped for a battle in the open field, and was prepared to accept its chances. At Bussaco, so he reasoned, his defeat had been the result of an over-bold attack on a strong position. The event might go otherwise if he threw the responsibility of the offensive on Wellington. He had secured for himself an advantageous fighting-ground: his left flank was protected by the formidable entrenchments around Santarem; his front was covered by the rain-sodden valley of the Rio Mayor, which during the winter season could be crossed only at a few well-known points. His right wing could not be turned, unless his adversary were ready to push a great force over villainous roads towards Alcanhede and the upper course of the Rio Mayor. And if Wellington should risk a large detachment in this direction, it might be possible to burst out from Santarem, against the containing force which he would be compelled to leave on the banks of the Tagus, about Cartaxo, and to beat it back towards the Lines—a movement which would almost certainly bring back the turning column from the North. For the English general could not dare to leave Lisbon exposed to the chances of a sudden blow, when there was little but Portuguese militia left to occupy the long chain of defensive works from Alhandra to Torres Vedras. For some weeks after his retreat to his new position at Santarem, Masséna lived in hopes that Wellington would either deliver an attack on his well-protected front, or undertake the dangerous turning movement towards his left.
No such chance was granted him. His adversary had weighed all the arguments for and against the offensive, and had made up his mind to rely rather on his old weapon—starvation—than on force. In several of his December dispatches he sums up the situation with perfect clearness; on the 2nd he wrote to Lord Liverpool, ‘It would still be impossible to make any movement of importance upon the right flank of the enemy’s position at Santarem without exposing some divisions of troops to be insulated and cut off. The enemy having concentrated their army about Torres Novas, &c., I do not propose to make any movement by which I incur the risk of involving the army in a general action, on ground less advantageous than that which I had fixed upon to bring this contest to an issue [i. e. the Lines]. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied army, and I should forward their views by placing the fate of the campaign on the result of a general action on ground chosen by them, and not on that selected by me. I therefore propose to continue the operation of light detachments on their flanks and rear, to confine them as much as possible, but to engage in no serious affair on ground on which the result can be at all doubtful[1].’ At the end of the month he simply restates his decision: ‘Having such an enemy to contend with, and knowing (as I do) that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of replacing any large losses I might sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by disastrous consequence to the cause of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which has hitherto saved all, and which will, I hope, end in the defeat of the enemy[2].’