The casualties in action between October 23rd and November 19th are easily ascertainable, and quite moderate. But the loss in ‘missing’ by the capture of stragglers, marauders, and footsore men, was much higher than is generally known. I believe that the annexed table, from the morning state of November 29th, is now published for the first time. It gives only the rank and file missing, but these are almost the whole list: officers and sergeants did not straggle or drop behind like the privates. I believe that the total of officers missing was 25, of sergeants 56 British and 29 Portuguese: we have also to add 43 British and 32 Portuguese drummers, &c., to the general list, which runs as follows:

British.Portuguese.Total.
1st Cavalry Division192192
2nd Cavalry Division1018109
1st Division Infantry283283
2nd Division Infantry302260562
3rd Division Infantry184230414
4th Division Infantry30819327
5th Division Infantry453359812
6th Division Infantry9674170
7th Division Infantry357243600
Light Division Infantry92163253
Portuguese. Hamilton’s Division221221
Portuguese. Pack’s Brigade293293
Portuguese. Bradford’s Brigade514514
Total2,3682,3744,752

The abnormally high totals of the 5th Division and 7th Division are to be accounted for in different ways. The former had 150 prisoners taken in action on the day of the combat of Villa Muriel (October 25); the latter contained the two battalions that always gave a high percentage of deserters, the foreign regiments of Brunswick-Oels and Chasseurs Britanniques. It will be noted that the 2nd Division has also a high total, but as it had nearly double the numbers of any other division (7,500 men to an average 4,000 for the others) it did not lose out of proportion to its strength. It will be noted that the Portuguese lost more heavily in relation to their total numbers than the British—their ‘missing’ were about the same as those of the British, but they only had about 20,000 rank and file in the field as against about 30,000 British. This excessive loss in missing was due entirely to the fact that the cold and rain of the last ten days of the retreat told much more heavily upon them. They were not so well clothed or fed as the British, and fell behind from exhaustion. Bradford’s brigade, though never seriously in action, lost 500 men out of 1,600 by the roadside, much the heaviest percentage in the whole army.

The losses in killed and wounded as opposed to ‘missing’ seem to make up the following moderate figures, to which the heavy fighting about Venta del Pozo and Villa Muriel during the first days of the retreat made much the heaviest contribution.

Killed: 9 officers, 189 men. Wounded: 54 officers, 699 men—i. e. the total of 951. This does not, of course, include the prisoners taken at Venta del Pozo or Villa Muriel, who are counted among the ‘missing’ reckoned in the prefixed table. The losses in killed and wounded at Alba de Tormes and San Muñoz are less than might have been expected; those in the other skirmishes at Valladolid, Tordesillas, &c., quite negligible.

V

THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTALLA: APRIL 1813

Sir John Murray reports his army to have consisted of the following elements:

Infantry: British, German, Anglo-Italian, Calabrese8,274officersand men
Sicilian ‘Estero’ Regiment1,136
Whittingham’s Spanish Division (6 batts.)3,901
Roche’s Spanish Division (5 batts.)4,019
Cavalry: British, Spanish, and Sicilian886
Artillery, &c.500
18,716

The units appear to have been brigaded as follows: