[6] Ibid., ix. pp. 383-4 and 386-7.
[7] Ibid., ix. p. 398.
[8] The best account of all this is in the diary for August of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons, who was in charge of the outlying party that went to Valtanas.
[9] The actual numbers (as shown in the tables given in vol. v, Appendix xi—which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) were July 15, 49,636; August 1, 39,301. The deficiency of about 600 cavalry lost had been more than replaced by Chauvel’s 750 sabres. There was a shortage of twenty guns of the original artillery, but Chauvel had brought up six.
[10] Dispatch printed in King Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. p. 64.
[11] Clausel to Clarke, August 18th, 1812.
[12] The 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 25th Léger, the 1st, 15th, 36th, 50th, 62nd, 65th, 118th, 119th, 120th Line had to cut themselves down by a battalion each: the 22nd and 101st, which had been the heaviest sufferers of all, and had each lost their eagle, were reduced from three to one battalion each. There had been seventy-four battalions in the Army of Portugal on July 1st: on August 1st there were only fifty-seven.
[13] See ‘Memorandum for General Santocildes’ of August 5. Dispatches, ix. pp. 344-5.
[14] Dispatches, ix. pp. 389-90.
[15] The best account of all this is not (as might have been expected) in Foy’s dispatches to Clausel, but in a memorandum drawn up by him in 1817 at the request of Sir Howard Douglas, and printed in an appendix at the end of the life of that officer (pp. 429-30). Sir Howard had asked Foy what he intended to do on the 23rd-27th August, and got a most interesting reply.