[46] Ibid., ix. p. 465.
[47] See Wellington to Castaños of 7 October. Dispatches, ix. p. 477.
[48] See Napier, iv. p. 412, who had the fact from Sir Edward Pakenham’s own mouth.
[49] Howard Douglas’s proposal to get up big guns at once on September 20 is detailed at length in his biography, pp. 210-11. Napier has a good deal to say on it. Jones and Burgoyne tell nothing about it, but they were evidently nettled at the idea that Douglas, who had no official position in the army, should have raised a proposal and got Wellington to listen to it. I fancy that Douglas is one of the officers alluded to by Burgoyne (Correspondence, i. p. 234) as unauthorized persons, who volunteered useless advice. Gomm, p. 287, says, ‘we have set to work idly without having the means we might have commanded.’
[50] Burgoyne, i. p. 220.
[51] Ibid., i. p. 233.
[52] Alexander Dickson remarks in his diary, p. 772, ‘This was done to please General Clinton, and had nothing to do with the attack.’ Clinton’s troops were opposite this side of the Castle, and had as yet not been entrusted with any important duty.
[53] Jones, i. p. 357.
[54] For this dialogue, told at length, see Burgoyne’s Correspondence, ed. Wrottesley, i. p. 235.
[55] So I make out from the returns, but Beamish’s and Schwertfeger’s Histories of the K.G.L. both give the lesser figure of 75—still sufficiently high!