[466] Wellington to Graham, Dispatches, x. 401.
[467] That the charges were not pushed home is shown by the casualties—10 wounded in the Royals, 1 killed no wounded in the 1st Hussars K.G.L.
[468] Creditable as was the conduct of Villatte’s infantry, it is hyperbole to say with Napier (v. p. 98) that ‘the dauntless survivors won their way in the face of 30,000 enemies!’ For only 1,600 British horsemen were up, and the nearest allied infantry was 6 or 8 miles away.
[469] Jourdan (Mémoires, p. 464) holds that Villatte was to blame, and ‘engagea le combat mal à propos,’ but considers that he was ‘faiblement suivi’ by Fane and Alten. He acknowledges the loss of some of Villatte’s guns, probably in error, for Wellington speaks of captured caissons only in his report of the affair. Martinien’s list of casualties shows hardly any officer-casualties on this day in Villatte’s division.
[470] See the elaborate dispatch of June 28 (to Hill, Dispatches, x. pp. 402-4).
[471] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 466.
[472] For all this see Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, x. pp. 402-4.
[473] There are some slips either in the original or the copy of the Marching Orders printed in Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. pp. 215-16. For Carazedo, given on the itinerary of the 1st Division, is many miles from it, though it is on the proper line of the 5th Division, which was going to Outeiro and not to Braganza. Limão on the itinerary of the 3rd Division should be Vinhas, if I am not mistaken.
[474] Another odd error in Marching Orders given in Wellington Dispatches, x. p. 368, had turned the Portuguese heavy guns into infantry ‘18th Portuguese Brigade’ which should read ‘Portuguese 18-pounder brigade.’ There was no higher numbered Portuguese infantry brigade than the 10th. This misprint has misled many historians.
[475] See Tomkinson, p. 232, for the road by Chaves and Monforte.