[546] Digeon in his report insists that he thought there was something more behind Longa. But this is ex post facto allegation.
[547] Napier, v. p. 134.
[548] Cf. events in the Nimy-Obourg Salient at Mons on August 22, 1914.
[549] The classical instance of the proper defence of a river front is (I suppose) Lee’s defence of the Rappahannock at the battle of Fredericksburg. For the ruinous fate of an army which gets across at one or two points of a long front, and is counter-attacked, cf. the battle of the Katzbach, fought two months after Vittoria.
[550] Especially the bridges of Tres Puentes and Nanclares by which a reconnaissance was made on June 20, and that of Mendoza up-stream. See Jourdan, p. 473.
[551] Blakiston’s Twelve Years of Military Adventure, ii. p. 207.
[552] And this not belonging to the Army of the South, but to d’Erlon—Avy’s 27th Chasseurs.
[553] This story is given by Gazan in his report, as a proof that Jourdan had ample warning that there was danger from the north as well as from the east.
[554] These troops were ‘nobody’s children’ and get ignored in Gazan’s and Reille’s reports. But we hear of the 3rd Line defending Gamarra Menor in one French report, a fact corroborated by its showing two officer-casualties in Martinien’s lists—the guns are mentioned in Tirlet’s artillery report. Cavalry of the Army of the North is vaguely mentioned—its presence seems established by an officer-casualty of the 15th Chasseurs in Martinien. I suspect the presence of part of the 10th Léger, which has an officer-casualty, Vittoria 22nd June, presumably a misprint for 21st.
[555] Dispatches, x. p. 449, says that Reille had two divisions in reserve (they were only two brigades) in addition to his front line holding the bridges: and cf. x. p. 450, which says directly that four divisions of Reille’s army were present.