[576] Gazan’s most unconvincing account of all this engagement is that ‘General Villatte attacked the enemy with his usual vigour: nothing could resist the shock of his division. The position, whose recapture ought to have assured us the victory, was retaken, as well as the height in front of Subijana. The enemy was routed at every point. Such was the position of the Army of the South, when news came to the King that our troops by the Zadorra were attacked, and could not maintain themselves. I was told to break off my attack and retire to a position further back.’
[577] The 71st lost, beside their well-loved colonel—the only man mentioned in Wellington’s private letter of next morning to his brother Henry (Dispatches, x. p. 454)—44 killed, 272 wounded, and nearly 40 prisoners: half the battalion. The 50th lost only 7 officers and 97 men; the 92nd no more than 20 men. If Villatte gave correct figures, his total loss was only 2 officers and 289 men—including 22 prisoners. Of these the 63rd, obviously the leading regiment, was responsible for 135 casualties, the 95th for 94. The other two regiments had practically no losses. These figures are very low, but seem to be corroborated by Martinien.
[578] Its heavy loss of 33 officers and 515 men out of about 2,200 present was nearly all, I believe, suffered at this point. The 2/87th with 244 casualties out of about 600 present lost 40 per cent. of its strength. Chassé’s French brigade, the immediate opponents, had 800 casualties, nearly all at this moment.
[579] Why did not Dalhousie support Colville more promptly? He had a bridge to cross, and some way to go, but was evidently late.
[580] These details come mainly out of the Mémoire sur la Retraite des Armées françaises in the French Archives, lent me by Mr. Fortescue. Internal evidence shows it written by some member of D’Erlon’s staff. Tirlet’s report is also useful.
[581] Captured by skirmishers of the 1/95th, as it was retreating up the high road and was nearing Ariñez. The French infantry recovered it for a moment by a counter-stroke, but as the Riflemen had cut the traces and shot or removed the horses, they could not get the gun away. Tirlet says the battery lost only one gun, which is corroborated by Costello of the 95th, present on the spot. Kincaid and other Riflemen say three.
[582] There is a curious problem connected with a correspondence (Dispatches, x. pp. 329-31) between Picton and Wellington on July 16—three weeks after the battle. Wellington apparently thought that Picton blamed the 88th for losing Ariñez in the first assault, while it was really only two companies of the 1/95th which had entered that village and been driven out. He says that he had seen the 88th coming into action in a very ragged line, and had himself halted them and dressed their front, before he let them go on: after this he did not notice what became of them, but saw them again after the fighting formed on the other side of the village.
What Wellington did not witness is chronicled by Costello of the 1/95th: after describing the repulse of the Riflemen, he notes their pleasure at seeing ‘our favourite third division’ coming down the road. Ariñez was promptly retaken and the advance recommenced. ‘I noticed a regiment, which by its yellow facings was the Connaught Rangers, marching in close column of companies to attack a French regiment drawn up in line on the verge of the hill, with a small village [Gomecha?] in its rear. The 88th, although under a heavy cannonade from the enemy’s artillery, continued advancing gallantly, while we skirmishers took ground to the left, close to the road, in order to allow them to oppose this line in front. Though we were hotly engaged I watched their movements. The 88th next deployed into line, advancing all the time towards their opponents, who seemed to wait very coolly for them. When they had approached within 300 yards the French poured in a volley, or I should rather say a running fire from right to left. As soon as the British regiment recovered the first shock, and closed their files on the gap that had been made, they commenced advancing at double time till within fifty yards nearer to the enemy, when they halted and in turn gave a running fire from the whole line, and then without a moment’s pause, cheered and charged up the hill against them. The French meanwhile were attempting to reload. But they were hard pressed by the British, who gave them no time for a second volley. They went immediately to the right about, making the best of their way to the village behind.’
From this it is clear that the 88th fought on open ground, to the right of Ariñez and the high road. It was the centre regiment of the brigade: the 45th, therefore, must have been more to the right and well south of the road; the 74th on the high road were the actual takers of Ariñez. We have unluckily no description of Power’s Portuguese at the moment—but they lost heavily—the casualties being 25 officers and 386 men. They must have been engaged with Leval’s 2nd Brigade, which had been stationed about and to the north of Gomecha, while the 1st Brigade held the village of Ariñez and the hill behind.
[583] The amusing story told of this storm by Harry Smith in his autobiography (i. pp. 97-8) is too good to be omitted. ‘My brigade was sent to support the 7th Division, which was hotly engaged. I was sent forward to report to Lord Dalhousie, who commanded. I found his lordship and his Q.M.G. Drake in deep conversation. I reported pretty quick, and asked for orders (the head of the brigade was just getting under fire). I repeated the question, “What orders, my lord?” Drake became somewhat animated, and I heard his lordship say, “Better take the village.” I roared out, “Certainly, my lord,” and off I galloped, both calling to me to come back, but “none are so deaf as those who won’t hear.” I told General Vandeleur we were immediately to take the village. The 52nd deployed into line, our Riflemen were sent out in every direction, keeping up a fire nothing could resist.... The 52nd in line and the swarm of Riflemen rushed at the village, and though the ground was intersected by gardens and ditches nothing ever checked us, until we reached the rear of it. There was never a more impetuous onset—nothing could resist such a burst of determination.’ Smith’s addition that the brigade took twelve guns in this charge seems (as Mr. Fortescue remarks) to be of more doubtful value.