Oxford,
June 1922.
CONTENTS
| SECTION XXXIV | ||
| The Burgos Campaign | ||
| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
| [I.] | Wellington in the North: Burgos Invested. September 1812 | [1] |
| [II.] | The Siege of Burgos. September 19-October 30, 1812 | [21] |
| [III.] | Wellington’s Retreat from Burgos. (1) From the Arlanzon to the Douro. October 22-30 | [52] |
| [IV.] | Hill’s Retreat from Madrid. October 25-November 6 | [87] |
| [V.] | Operations round Salamanca. November 1-15 | [111] |
| [VI.] | Wellington’s Retreat from the Tormes to the Agueda. November 16-20 | [143] |
| [VII.] | Critical Summary of the Campaigns of 1812 | [167] |
| SECTION XXXV | ||
| [I.] | Winter Quarters. November-December 1812-January 1813 | [181] |
| [II.] | The Troubles of a Generalissimo. Wellington at Cadiz and Freneda | [194] |
| [III.] | Wellington and Whitehall | [214] |
| [IV.] | The Perplexities of King Joseph. February-April 1813 | [239] |
| [V.] | The Northern Insurrection. February-May 1813 | [252] |
| [VI.] | An Episode on the East Coast, April 1813. The Campaign of Castalla | [275] |
| SECTION XXXVI | ||
| The March to Vittoria | ||
| [I.] | Wellington’s Plan of Campaign | [299] |
| [II.] | Operations of Hill’s Column. May 22-June 3, 1813 | [313] |
| [III.] | Operations of Graham’s Column. May 26-June 3, 1813 | [322] |
| [IV.] | Movements of the French. May 22-June 4, 1813 | [334] |
| [V.] | The Operations around Burgos. June 4-14, 1813 | [346] |
| [VI.] | Wellington crosses the Ebro. June 15-20, 1813 | [364] |
| [VII.] | The Battle of Vittoria, June 21, 1813: The First Stage | [384] |
| [VIII.] | The Battle of Vittoria: Rout of the French | [413] |
| SECTION XXXVII | ||
| The Expulsion of the French from Spain | ||
| [I.] | Wellington’s Pursuit of Clausel. June 22-30, 1813 | [451] |
| [II.] | Graham’s Pursuit of Foy. June 22-31, 1813 | [470] |
| [III.] | The East Coast. Murray at Tarragona. June 2-18, 1813 | [488] |
| [IV.] | Wellington on the Bidassoa. July 1-12, 1813 | [522] |
| [V.] | Exit King Joseph. July 12, 1813 | [546] |
| SECTION XXXVIII | ||
| The Battles of the Pyrenees | ||
| [I.] | The Siege of St. Sebastian: the First Period, July 12-25 | [557] |
| [II.] | Soult takes the Offensive in Navarre. July 1813 | [587] |
| [III.] | Roncesvalles and Maya. July 25, 1813 | [608] |
| [IV.] | Sorauren. July 28, 1813 | [642] |
| [V.] | Soult’s Retreat. Second Battle of Sorauren. July 30 | [681] |
| [VI.] | Soult Retires into France. July 31-August 3, 1813 | [707] |
| APPENDICES | ||
| [I.] | British Losses at the Siege of Burgos. September 20-October 21, 1812 | [741] |
| [II.] | The French Armies in Spain. Morning State of October 15, 1812 | [741] |
| [III.] | Strength of Wellington’s Army during and after the Burgos Retreat. October-November 1813 | [745] |
| [IV.] | British Losses in the Burgos Retreat | [747] |
| [V.] | Murray’s Army at Castalla. April 1813 | [748] |
| [VI.] | Suchet’s Army at Castalla | [749] |
| [VII.] | British Losses at Biar and Castalla | [750] |
| [VIII.] | Wellington’s Army in the Vittoria Campaign | [750] |
| [IX.] | Spanish Troops under Wellington’s Command. June-July 1813 | [753] |
| [X.] | The French Army at Vittoria | [754] |
| [XI.] | British and Portuguese Losses at Vittoria | [757] |
| [XII.] | French Losses at Vittoria | [761] |
| [XIII.] | Sir John Murray’s Army in the Tarragona Expedition | [762] |
| [XIV.] | Suchet’s Army in Valencia and Catalonia. June 1813 | [763] |
| [XV.] | Spanish Armies on the East Coast. June 1813 | [764] |
| [XVI.] | The Army of Spain as reorganized by Soult. July 1813 | [765] |
| [XVII.] | British Losses at Maya and Roncesvalles. July 25, 1813 | [768] |
| [XVIII.] | British Losses at Sorauren. July 28, 1813 | [769] |
| [XIX.] | British Losses at the Second Battle of Sorauren and the Combat of Beunza. July 30, 1813 | [770] |
| [XX.] | British Losses in Minor Engagements. July 31-August 2, 1813 | [772] |
| [XXI.] | Portuguese Losses in the Campaign of the Pyrenees | [773] |
| [XXII.] | French Losses in the Campaign of the Pyrenees | [774] |
| [INDEX] | [775] | |
| MAPS AND PLANS | |||
| [I.] | Plan of Siege Operations at Burgos. September-October 1812 | To face | [48] |
| [II.] | Operations round Salamanca. November 1812 | ” | [130] |
| [III.] | Battle of Castalla | ” | [274] |
| [IV.] | General Map of Northern Spain for the Burgos and Vittoria Campaigns | [End of volume] | |
| [V.] | Plan of the Battle of Vittoria | To face | [434] |
| [VI.] | Plan of the Siege of St. Sebastian | ” | [584] |
| [VII.] | General Map of the Country between Bayonne and Pampeluna | ” | [606] |
| [VIII.] | Combat of Roncesvalles | ” | [622] |
| [IX.] | Combat of Maya | ” | [636] |
| [X.] | First Battle of Sorauren. July 28 | ” | [640] |
| [XI.] | Second Battle of Sorauren and Combat of Beunza. July 30 | ” | [670] |
| ILLUSTRATIONS | ||
| Portrait of Sir Rowland Hill | [Frontispiece] | |
| King Joseph at Mortefontaine | To face page | [544] |
SECTION XXXIV
THE BURGOS CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
WELLINGTON IN THE NORTH: BURGOS INVESTED
AUGUST 31st-SEPTEMBER 20th, 1812
The year 1812 was packed with great events, and marked in Spain no less than in Russia the final turn of the tide in the history of Napoleon’s domination. But the end was not yet: when Wellington entered Madrid in triumph on August 12th, the deliverance of the Peninsula was no more certain than was the deliverance of Europe when the French Emperor evacuated Moscow on October 22nd. Vittoria and Leipzig were still a year away, and it was not till they had been fought and won that the victory of the Allies was secure. The resources of the great enemy were so immense that it required more than one disaster to exhaust them. No one was more conscious of this than Wellington. Reflecting on the relative numbers of his own Anglo-Portuguese army and of the united strength of all the French corps in Spain, he felt that the occupation of Madrid was rather a tour de force, an admirable piece of political propaganda, than a decisive event. It would compel all the scattered armies of the enemy to unite against him, and he was more than doubtful whether he could make head against them. ‘I still hope,’ he wrote to his brother Henry, the Ambassador at Cadiz, ‘to maintain our position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages. But I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards[1].... I am apprehensive that all this may turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be overpowered, or should be obliged to retreat, what will the world say? What will the people of England say?... That we made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances; that from January 1st, 1812, we had gained more advantages for the cause, and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations than any army ever gained in such a period of time against so powerful an enemy; but that unaided by the Spanish army and government, we were finally overpowered, and compelled to withdraw within our old frontier.’