During the morning Confederate mounted troops appeared in small bodies within range of the outposts, to reconnoitre the position. About four o’clock in the afternoon nearly one hundred and fifty Confederates, mounted and dismounted, attacked the outposts and pickets, but made no attempt to advance in force. A desultory fire was maintained for one hour and a half, when the enemy retired.
Shortly after noon a heavy rain commenced, and continued until about half-past six o’clock, drenching the men to the skin, who maintained a battle line the greater part of the day as they had during the night. Stickney claims this was necessary, as he could not depend on the men falling into position with sufficient alacrity at the least warning.
The Federal position at dusk was about the same as on the previous day, except that two companies of the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts were added to the front line, two companies on the right flank in reverse, and one company upon the railroad bridge in support of the gun placed there.
Between five and six o’clock Lieutenant Tinkham was ordered to advance on the road to a point about one-quarter of a mile in front, with his Forty-Second Massachusetts detachment and some fifty negroes, to take down a rail fence that somewhat obstructed the view. While engaged in this work the enemy could be seen about another quarter of a mile up the road, somewhat covered by the woods. Captain Blober tried his best to draw them on, by riding towards them and circling around as the ground would permit, without effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney rode up and wanted a volley fired at them, but Lieutenant Tinkham informed him it would do no good, as his men were armed with Springfield smooth-bore guns that would not reach the distance. Finally a volley was fired, without effect, when Stickney told the lieutenant to hold on and he would send out a field-gun, which was done.
It was shortly after this fence was levelled that the enemy, dismounted, with a yell, and opening fire at the same time, made a charge. The field-gun, after three discharges of canister shot, was abandoned by the Twenty-Fifth New York artillery-men, although Lieutenant Tinkham suggested to the gunner in command to fire in retreat. The gunner was either a coward or too frightened to listen to any orders or suggestions, and the gun was left. As the gunners retreated Lieutenant Tinkham, who had his men in line to the rear in support, upon one side of the road, wheeled the detachment into line across the bayou road and gave the enemy a volley from his smooth-bores, carrying a ball and three buckshot to each musket, almost point-blank in their faces. They were not over ten paces distant. This volley staggered them for a few minutes, as well it might, for an uglier weapon to face at close quarters than those Springfield smooth-bore muskets, even in the hands of raw troops, could not be found in the entire army at that time.
Promptly faced about, the detachment was double-quicked back to the battle line as fast as the mud and slippery condition of the road would allow, for the rain had caused the Louisiana soil of that region to assume the consistency of a sticky paste, so well known to all campaigners in the Gulf Department. With this uncertain footing, the close proximity of the enemy, fairly on their heels,[16] yelling and firing, and the balance of the Federal force in line of battle also opening fire, placing the detachment between two lines of fire, it is remarkable that the casualties were so few at this time. Not a man was taken prisoner. Major Morgans did not expect the detachment would be able to get back, but reserved the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York fire as long as he dared, and then opened an oblique firing, to prevent any harm to the detachment, if possible.
[16] One of the curious events of the action, which also proves the close proximity of the enemy, was that a Confederate lieutenant-colonel, mounted upon an iron-grey horse, who must have distanced his men in the charge they made, got around and ahead, by the flank, and led the Forty-Second detachment on its retreat to the main line. This officer came in contact with men of the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, who made him a prisoner, as related later on in this chapter.
The Forty-Second detachment was not out as skirmishers, and did not have that formation. It was on a special duty and had performed that duty. No orders were given the lieutenant except to support the field-gun. What had become of the pickets and outposts Lieutenant Tinkham did not know. The enemy were upon him almost without warning, for they had crept up in the tall grass on his front. In his official report Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says: “The enemy advanced rapidly and soon compelled the pickets to fall back on the main line, which they reached in rather a straggling condition at our left wing.” This could not mean the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts, for they did nothing of the kind. The detachment ran in, maintaining as good an alignment as the slippery soil would allow.
A ridiculous proceeding occurred just after the detachment reached the line. A second-lieutenant, an acting staff-officer, came up in an excited manner and ordered Lieutenant Tinkham to go back and retake the abandoned gun. Tinkham replied he would see him d—d first, and to go and get it himself. With the darkness, fire opened on the enemy in front, the bad condition of the ground and the uncertainty just where the gun was at that moment, made the undertaking foolhardy, without a chance for success; in reality giving the enemy a present of so many prisoners. It was another instance of that want of judgment in an inexperienced officer, of which many examples were furnished in the whole history of General “Dick” Taylor’s raid towards New Orleans.
After reaching the line the detachment was posted on the extreme left, resting on the bayou and covering the road. Firing was continuate until about eight o’clock. The artillery used canister; there not being any canister for the 6 Pr. gun, packages of musket ammunition were used instead. The infantry were ordered to fire by rank, and opened in that manner, soon substituting firing at will. The smoke became quite dense and would not lift readily, on account of the dampness of the atmosphere. Nothing could be seen in front, not even flashes of the enemy’s guns; nothing to be heard, except continued reports of artillery and musketry-firing.