History of the Forty-second regiment infantry, Massachusetts volunteers, 1862, 1863, 1864

by Charles P. Bosson

Kuhn’s Wharf was the largest on the harbor front, the storehouse end large and roomy, connected with the land by a bridge-like wharf some four hundred feet long, about twenty feet wide, built on piling. The water was quite shallow at any tide almost to the end. Tides in Galveston harbor and bay ebb and flow very little; the depth of water is greatly influenced by heavy northerly winds, which blow the water over the bar out to sea. Heavy draft vessels at such times must keep to the narrow channel.

A flag-pole was found which belonged on the storehouse, and being placed in position upon the cupola, the old garrison flag, used by the regiment at Readville, was run up about eleven o’clock and greeted with cheers. Sentries were at once posted in the city as far as Market Square, one of the principal places with all of the main streets leading into it. They were also posted on the streets to the right and left, communicating directly with the wharf. At night these posts were reënforced in such a manner as to constitute picket-posts.

Immediately upon landing and taking post, Colonel Burrell adopted such measures to secure all the protection possible that in his judgment the situation demanded. From this time until the morning of January 1st it was work, work, work. Fatigue and working parties were constantly employed. Guards and pickets were on duty day and night. Reconnoitring detachments were on duty by day and squads scouting at night. The Forty-Second Infantry, posted upon Kuhn’s Wharf, were very active during their short stay, occupying the city so far as the small force and prudence would allow, and exercising proper surveillance. The men were barely allowed sufficient time to obtain needed sleep.

Among the first things done was to barricade the interior of the storehouse facing the city, by placing against that side, on each floor, barrels of whiting, plaster and hair, found on the premises. For a temporary shelter to men on picket at night, if forced to seek it, it was decided to build a breastwork upon the wharf by tearing up and utilizing the planks. Volunteer Engineer Long saw no use or necessity for this, not exercising any supervision over the work until operations had commenced and he saw that the colonel was determined about it. Commencing at a point some fifty feet from the shore end, the hard pine planks were removed to make a gap in the wharf for the space of about another fifty feet, and the first breastwork was erected on the edge of this gap the day of landing. Fortunately Quartermaster Burrell, in looking around the city in the morning, had found a keg of large-sized spikes and ordered them taken to the wharf where they might be found useful. They were very useful in building this work.

An examination of the ammunition, ordered in a few days after landing when it was evident the enemy meant mischief, was not a welcome surprise. Company G was armed with Springfield rifles, and Companies D and I had Springfield smooth-bore muskets. The bulk of ammunition landed was found to be for rifles, with only a small supply of ball and buckshot cartridges for smooth-bores. There was also found to be a scarcity of caps. This is accounted for by the confused manner in which the regiment was embarked at Brooklyn on the different transports—a proper apportionment of the ammunition was not possible under the circumstances. Sending Adjutant Davis to the fleet for any surplus caps they had to spare added very little to the supply, as they were short also. It was found that cartridges and caps sufficient to give each man eighteen rounds in his cartridge box was all the ammunition that could be made serviceable when a distribution was made to the men on the thirty-first. This was kept a secret from the command. The men were cautioned to husband their ammunition until it could be used to effect at close quarters, in case of an action. No man was to fire his musket unless so ordered by an officer.

Commander Wainwright, with a few sailors armed with cutlasses and pistols, visited the wharf on the twenty-sixth. After a conference with Colonel Burrell, a reconnoissance through Galveston and its suburbs was determined upon. Captain Sherive, with about one hundred men, including the sailors, accompanied by the colonel, adjutant, quartermaster and chaplain, with Wainwright, started about nine o’clock in the morning to reconnoitre, proceeding as far as the brick kilns, some two miles outside of the city. It was not deemed advisable to go further in the direction of Eagle Grove, about three miles, but a circuit of the outskirts was made and the city looked over. The inhabitants had fled. It was almost entirely deserted. Unlike many other cities and towns occupied by Federal troops, very few colored people were to be seen. A lookout was established in a four-story brick building on the Strand near Market Square and within the guard lines, where all that was going on at Eagle Grove on the island, and Virginia Point on the main-land, was distinctly visible in the daytime by the aid of a field-glass. This lookout was constantly maintained.

In the afternoon Colonel Burrell, accompanied by Volunteer Engineer Long, proceeded in the Harriet Lane towards West Bay as far as the channel would allow. A good view of Eagle Grove and Virginia Point was obtained. The earthwork, mounting three guns, thrown up at Eagle Grove by Confederates, to protect the railroad bridge, was abandoned. The end of the bridge at Virginia Point was protected by extensive works with heavy guns in position, and here the enemy appeared to be in force. Their camps could be plainly seen.

It was while on this trip in the Harriet Lane that Colonel Burrell made up his mind to destroy the railroad bridge. None of the naval vessels could get near enough to do any permanent damage, on account of the narrow, tortuous and shallow channel. The distance from the fleet anchorage by way of the channel was about four and one-half miles. Heavy naval guns, fired from a point of anchorage where it would have been safe to try it, would not have reached the bridge with any accuracy, the gun-carriages not admitting a sufficient elevation of the guns to carry shot or shell that distance, while such heavy charges of powder would be required for the distance that the concussion upon the gun-decks of such vessels as were then at Galveston would have caused serious damage to the vessels, had everything been favorable in other particulars for attempting the destruction of the bridge in this manner. The bridge could not be effectually severed by the navy except by sending up armed launches prepared for such duty. These the gunboats did not have; all of their row-boats were small, not capable of carrying light guns, even if they had them. This would have been hazardous service, as the enemy were vigilant and brave. That the navy could have sent up boat crews and destroyed it when the vessels first entered the harbor in October, was admitted by a number of naval officers, because the enemy had precipitately taken flight, abandoning everything. The Confederate military commander at that time was a weak-kneed sort of man. In a very short time the Confederate troops rallied, removed all of their guns on the island, and built the works at Eagle Grove rendering the attempt hazardous. Destroying the bridge would not have prevented all communication between the island and the main-land, only rendered it difficult, as the enemy had plenty of boats hid in the creeks and bayous adjacent that could be used for ferry purposes. But no attempt of any sort had been made by the navy since first entering Galveston Bay to damage or sever this bridge.

Collecting barrels of tar pitch, with other combustible material, and confiscating a dray (all horses had been run out of town), the colonel ordered them stored ready for use, intending to move up immediately on the landing of the balance of his regiment, occupy the works at Eagle Grove, destroy the bridge as far as possible, mount some heavy guns, and shell the enemy from his works on the main-land. Those naval officers who talked the matter over with officers of the Forty-Second agreed that it ought to be done. Commander Wainwright was especially in favor of severing this means of communication. Had the seven companies of the regiment arrived on or before the twenty-eighth of December, it was thought not much difficulty would have been experienced. The enemy soon ascertained the small strength of the detachment landed, and on the twenty-ninth reoccupied the earthworks at Eagle Grove, and mounted heavy cannon to protect the bridge and approaches. Colonel Burrell then requested Commander Renshaw to go up the bay as far as possible with two of his lightest draft vessels, and shell the enemy from the island, which he refused to do. After the twenty-eighth December, the destruction of this bridge could not have been accomplished without an action with the enemy in force at Eagle Grove, but an attempt would have been made had not the event of January 1st occurred.

During the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, while Captain Sherive with a small force of men was out on a foraging expedition, to see what could be found for cooking-stoves, eight Confederate cavalry-men appeared under a flag of truce, with a request to see the British consul. No flag-of-truce trick could be played on Captain Sherive. He promptly halted the party, and notified his commanding officer. One man, under guard, was allowed to see the consul, and the Confederate captain in charge was ordered to leave by six o’clock, as after that hour they would be fired upon. For weeks had the enemy enjoyed the hospitality of Commander Renshaw under these convenient flags of truce, used freely for the most trivial reasons; but the military commander stopped all such nonsense at once. This truce flag was the only one recognized until the day of surrender.