The time and energy of all troops at the post was frittered away in this manner without any good accruing from it; instead of devoting the same time and labor to what was absolutely needed, i. e., to prepare defences for use in case of emergency, with plenty of idle convalescent men at hand capable of rendering assistance, besides a large number of negroes whose labor could be utilized. No intelligent attempt was made to organize the convalescent men for service, or to render efficient a number of field-guns that were in Brashear, posted on the river front.
The enemy was active in an annoying sort of way across the river, on the Berwick side, after it had been abandoned by troops of the garrison, and on the line of the Atchafalaya River. Danger of an attack existed from the first day of June.[10] The officers of the Forty-Second detachment soon learned from various sources that the situation was rather ticklish. Even privates came into possession of information, from the many negroes in and around Brashear, that the enemy was up to mischief, and trying to get in between Brashear and New Orleans, upon the line of railroad.
[10] The official report of General Banks mentions the fact that the officials at Brashear City were fully warned of danger, by orders, and the disaster was due to the carelessness and disobedience of subordinates. General Emory sent word by a steamer (after the telegraph line was severed) to hold out to the last. The place was captured before this steamer could arrive.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney was not a man calculated to inspire confidence as to his military abilities. He had a habit of riding around, often alone, to give verbal orders for all sorts of petty things, and to find fault with trifles. As to perfecting the organization of what troops he had, or establishing any system out of the chaos that existed, there seems to be but one verdict from those on duty under him. He did nothing. No one knew what the position of other bodies of troops would be in case of an attack; no one knew what was expected or required to be done in case the enemy appeared. No one knew where to expect support in case of need, or to whom or how to render such support if wanted. Lieutenant Tinkham reports that there did not seem to be a head to anything. First-Sergeant Ballou reports that most of his time was occupied in finding food for the detachment, and that it appeared to him as though the Forty-Second were visitors who had remained too long, but did not leave because there was no one to tell them to go. The testimony of all the observing men is of a like nature.
All the various detachments on duty had no knowledge of each other, were acting without concert, had never before co-operated, were entirely destitute of esprit de corps, while a half-regiment on duty would have had all of these essentials, so requisite to a body of men expected to defend an important post in daily danger of an attack. It would be safe to say, not in a boastful spirit, had the four or six companies of the Forty-Second Regiment, in camp at Bayou Gentilly and at the posts on Lake Ponchartrain, been at Brashear, that place would not have been lost without a fight of some duration. Under their own officers, the companies well acquainted with each other and of excellent material, cohesion and confidence would have existed, that made a gallant stand not only possible but almost certain. When Sir John Moore organized and disciplined the British army at Shorncliffe, it was on the basis of the regimental system. The object of this system was to make each regiment a living unit, by making officers and men thoroughly acquainted with each other. This engenders a feeling of close comradeship which is exemplified even now in the many regimental reunions that annually take place, where old times are revived and talked over without regard to present station in life.
The Forty-Second Regiment, since the days of Readville Camp, had shown on several occasions this feeling of comradeship. The men knew their officers (some of those officers better than they knew themselves), and with the companies at Gentilly Bayou were officers who had only to say what they wanted done, when the men would have done it without hesitation or fear.
Under the circumstances, as they existed, the congregation of troops at Brashear could not be expected to have done any better than they did.
June 14th Captain Cook obtained sick leave, and returned to the regiment at Bayou Gentilly. The men said, “his boots hurt him.” This hit can be appreciated by those who remember the elaborate high-top boots the captain was wont to wear. June 18th Lieutenant Clifford and a few enlisted men did the same thing. Lieutenant Clifford suggested to Lieutenant Tinkham how easily he could obtain sick leave also, if he desired; but Tinkham refused to entertain such an idea, preferring to stand by his men, and remained, the only commissioned officer with the detachment. The same day Clifford left, Sergeant Albert L. Clark, Company B, then at Gentilly, was ordered to his company at Brashear. In view of what subsequently happened, it seems a pity that two officers from the regiment of sound judgment and undoubted courage were not ordered to Brashear also.
The most extended scout in which any part of the detachment participated was on June 17th, when the steamer Kepper and gunboat Hollyhock, three guns, which had arrived on the sixteenth, carried a company One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York, a few cavalry, and a detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts, under Lieutenant Clifford, the entire force in command of a captain, One Hundred Seventy-Sixth New York, for a trip up the Bayou Teche to Pattersonville, on a foraging expedition. This expedition started at four o’clock in the morning. On landing, a skirmish line was formed and marched inland from the bayou. The line was then swung around in half-circle form, driving in all live stock that was found, aggregating some one hundred head of horses, mules, and cattle of all kinds. The day was, as usual, extremely hot, and when they arrived on the bayou the cattle were allowed a rest previous to attempting to make them take the water and be swum across. When a large bull had been caught, and by aid of boat and rope pulled into the water, with an encouraging prospect that the rest would follow, word was given by a lookout on the Hollyhock, “the enemy’s cavalry are coming!” The usual exaggerated stories were afloat at once. The report gained credence that their force was five thousand strong. A cool head would have known better. As a matter of fact the enemy was not over one hundred strong, probably nearer fifty men, while the Federals numbered about one hundred and fifty men.
Ordered to cease work, the troops hastened on board the Kepper, leaving the cattle to roam back to their homes and be picked up by the planters, who had followed the troops, protesting against taking their stock, for they were good Union men; at the same time they undoubtedly conveyed word to the enemy of what was going on. On arrival at Brashear, about five o’clock in the afternoon, it was found that quite a number of men were missing. The Kepper took aboard two guns, as an addition to her small armament, and volunteers were called for, to go back as a guard and assist in finding the stragglers. Tired and hungry as they were, without food all day (rations had not been carried in haversacks), volunteers were numerous. Going back a few miles, an exchange of shots with the enemy’s cavalry took place. The infantry upon the Kepper fired away most of their ammunition without doing any execution, because the Confederate cavalry kept at a respectful distance. A hail from the right bank of the river disclosed all of the stragglers, about twenty and mostly New York men, who were taken on board.