In theory, both the agent and the factor at Fort Wayne were responsible to their immediate superior, Governor Harrison, as commander of military forces and superintendent of Indian affairs in Indiana Territory. However, those agents, such as Wells, who held their positions prior to the creation of the territory continued to deal directly with the Secretary of War as well as with the Governor. Benjamin Stickney, Wells’ successor as agent, refused to recognize Harrison’s authority over him. The factor also received his orders from the Governor and the Secretary of War. More directly he was under the Superintendent of Indian Trade, an official answerable to both the Secretary of War and Congress. During the years before the War of 1812, the post of Superintendent of Indian Trade was held consecutively by William Irvine and John Mason. This lack of central authority pertaining to the factories and agencies only served to add to the confusion already created by the nature of the positions. At a later date, the agent assumed the duties of the factor and the latter term fell into disuse, but until the factory was destroyed by the Indians at Fort Wayne, the two positions remained separate and from the start, difficult to harmonize.
“Colonel” John Johnston served as the first Indian factor at Fort Wayne from 1802 to 1811. Johnston, a prominent figure in the northwest, during his lifetime served thirty-one years with the Department of Indian Affairs. He was born in Ireland on March 22, 1775, and came to America at the age of eleven. A few years later, while yet a youth, he undertook the job of driving supply wagons to Wayne’s army. After receiving his appointment as factor for Fort Wayne, Johnston married sixteen-year-old Rachel Robinson at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, much against the desire of the young girl’s parents. The Johnstons’ wedding trip consisted of the journey by horseback through the wilderness to Fort Wayne. While living at Fort Wayne, Colonel Johnston and his wife were noted for their stern rectitude, which contrasted considerably with the type of life generally found at this military outpost. In later life, Johnston, for his years of government service, became known as “Colonel Johnston”. He is described as “six feet and more in height, very erect, in his bearing and he had a blond complexion inclined to ruddy.”[42]
Besides his duties as factor, Colonel Johnston occasionally served as assistant surgeon at the fort. For his position as factor, Johnston received a salary of $1,000 a year from the government and $365 for subsistence. The latter amount was funded by the profits of the factory. In 1810, William Oliver was appointed to the Fort Wayne factory to serve as Johnston’s assistant. When Oliver resigned in 1812, Johnston secured the position for his brother, Stephen Johnston.
As factor, Johnston aimed at being just to the Indians and loyal to his government, a combination of purpose attended with many difficulties. In a report to the Secretary of War, Johnston pointed out that the trading houses with the northern Indians never produced any political effect in favor of the Americans, as had been expected when they were established. Rather, on the contrary, the Indians were led to believe that the object was to make money; and in as much as the government goods were never sold cheaper than those of the private traders, it was impossible to produce a different impression.[43]
Johnston had trouble procuring the proper kinds of supplies to issue to the Indians at Fort Wayne. The goods intended for the Indian trade were rarely imported into the United States, there being no regular demand for them. On the other hand, the British traders in Canada had agents in England, long accustomed to this commerce, who sent out the very articles needed. The supplies destined for the United States factories went through many hands, and this offered countless opportunities to defraud the Indians and the government. Often the goods came out of season or were damaged. Johnston constantly urged that the trade either be put in the hands of private traders who would be licensed by the government, or, if the government thought it necessary to stay in the business, an expert should be sent to England to do the purchasing of the Indian articles. Typical of the goods used by the Indians are the following items listed in Johnston’s record book, “blankets, strouds, [44] Johnston also complained that the military were generally unfriendly to his trading post and even hindered his work at times. Apparently this ill feeling was caused by the fact that the soldiers did not consider it a part of their business to furnish transportation for the furs and Indian goods or to erect the necessary buildings for the trade at Fort Wayne.[45] On one occasion, the factor lost in Lake Erie $2,300 worth of furs. Johnston claimed that the accident came about through the carelessness of a drunken non-commissioned officer, Joseph McMahan, although McMahan was excused of all responsibility by a court martial.[46] The result of the trial provoked Johnston so much that he protested to the Superintendent of Indian Trade, but nothing could be done.
During the decade of its existence prior to the War of 1812, the Fort Wayne factory was the most prosperous of all the trading houses established by the United States government. A report submitted by the Secretary of War to Congress showed that in the three years and ten months preceding January 13, 1812, the Fort Wayne factory made a profit of $10,502.77. This was by far the largest profit shown by any of the ten factories then operated throughout the nation.[47] Another report shows that the fur and peltries received from the Indians at the Fort Wayne factory sold for $27,547.07.[48] While the government did only a small fraction of the fur trading, this is a good indication that the fur trade of the Maumee and Wabash valleys which led the French to fortify the spot was still the principal economic asset of Fort Wayne. Colonel Johnston’s account books suggest that the once abundant beaver skins were becoming scarce. Instead of beaver, racoon and deer skins were being shipped in great quantities.[49] These furs were carried by way of Lake Erie to New York and Philadelphia, where they were sold at auctions. Most of the furs obtained from the private traders were taken to Detroit where they were purchased by the American Fur Company. Skins were worth deer, $1.25; raccoon, $.50; bear, $3.00 to $5.00. These values were nominal, as the price fluctuated and the furs were paid for in goods which were passed off on the Indians for more than double the initial cost and transportation.
In order to transport the skins, they were dried, compressed, and secured in packs. Each pack weighed about 100 pounds. A pirogue or boat, that was sufficiently large to carry forty packs, required the labor of four men to manage it on its voyage. In favorable stages of the river, such a vessel, under the management of skilled boatmen, was propelled by poles fifteen or twenty miles a day, against the current. On the return trips the pirogues were loaded with merchandise to be sold to the Indians.
Turning our attention once more to Indian treaties and their resulting difficulties, important events centered about Fort Wayne between the years 1800 and 1809. The year 1800 in which William Henry Harrison was appointed the first governor of the Indiana Territory was one of peace in the Great Lake region of the United States. The British had evacuated the posts they had held in the northwest, according to the agreement in the Jay treaty, and the Indians appeared content. At Fort Wayne, the future appeared so calm that William Wells wrote to Hamtramck that he expected the garrison to be withdrawn shortly.[50] However, the spark that set off the flames of Indian warfare was soon to be ignited and kept aglow by British intrigue. This spark was the never ending demand for new lands by the western settlers, which resulted in the attempts of the government to satisfy this demand by gaining new land cessions from the Indians.
Governor Harrison, on assuming his office, proceeded promptly to enter into treaty agreements with the Indians for the purchase of their large tracts of land in what are now the states of Indiana and Illinois. This was in accordance with President Jefferson’s objective, the acquisition from the Indians of the whole territory east of the Mississippi. Harrison sent word to the Indians to meet him at Fort Wayne in the summer of 1803 for the first of his important treaty councils. By June 7 of that year, he completed his task, having secured from the Eel River Miamis, Kaskaskia, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Wea tribes a large tract of land around Vincennes, as well as the valuable salt spring on the Saline Creek. This treaty had been brought to a successful conclusion for the United States through a combination of Harrison’s shrewdness and stubbornness in bargaining, the financial backing of the factory at Fort Wayne, and the influence of Capt. Wells over Little Turtle. Although Harrison and Johnston obtained the cooperation of Wells in gaining the consent of the Indians, the agent, for the most part, strove against any cession of lands by the Indians. Wells went so far as to instigate the Indians to protest to the national government against a treaty Harrison concluded with the Delawares and Piankashaws the following year.[51]
Between Colonel Johnston, the factor, and Wells, the agent, there was no coordination of purpose or even good will. Outside of the fact that the conflicting duties of their respective positions involved them in quarrels, Wells and Johnston seemed to have been mutually antagonistic, and each put the worst interpretation on the other’s actions when writing to their superiors. Wells felt that Johnston’s policy of trying to win an active alliance with the Indians for the United States in the event of war with Great Britain was in effect evidence of Johnston’s gullibility in dealing with the red men. Even after the battle of Tippecanoe, Johnston gave arms and ammunition to the Indians who had participated in the affair. Wells knew the Indians well, and realized that in the event of war the best that could be expected would be that they would remain neutral. On the other hand, Johnston felt that Wells was completely unprincipled and could not be trusted.