Outpost in the Wilderness: Fort Wayne, 1706-1828

by Charles R. Poinsatte

It is clear that the inhabitants of Miamitown were, for the most part, English partisans. Hay could not venture his “carcass” among the “parcel of renegards” [sic] at Vincennes.[103] When Antoine Lasselle did venture southward and was captured by the Indians who thought him to be sympathetic with the Americans, Major Murray intervened and the people of the village certified that Lasselle was “a good loyalist” and “always for supporting his King”.[104] When Lorraine, an inhabitant of Miamitown for forty years, died and was buried, “the young Volunteers of the place gave him three Vollies ... in Honor to his services rendered to the King of Great Britain.”[105] Evidently the time Lorraine had aided Pontiac’s Indians in capturing the British post at Ouiatenon was forgotten at this late date. Not all of the traders at Miamitown were good loyalists, however. James Abbott is described as being “one of our dis-affected subjects.” He refused to obtain the necessary permit for trading and spoke to the Indians of “Major Murray & Capt. McKee in so disrespectfull a manner that they ... determined to send Strings of Wampum into Detroit immediately to informe them of it.”[106]

On the first of April, 1790, Hay departed for Detroit, “much regretted by every one in the village”.[107] Less than seven months later Miamitown lay in ashes, ravaged by an American army which left 183 of its men dead in the vicinity. There is nothing in Hay’s journal to indicate that the French, English, or Indian occupants of the villages anticipated the blow which was to be dealt them by Harmar’s army, although they were fully aware of the movements which preceded the coming of Harmar. “John Thompson [107]

This and other councils were held. St. Clair, governor of the newly created Northwest Territory, following Washington’s instructions, offered peace to the Indians. Antoine Gamelin, a merchant from Vincennes favorably known by the Indians, was sent with the Governor’s overtures to the hostile Indians. The tribes along the Wabash would give Gamelin no answer until he conferred with those at Miamitown. Here, the Indians, as well as the traders, assembled to hear Gamelin’s speech. Their reply was evasive and unsatisfactory, while their true attitude was revealed by the burning of an American prisoner only three days after Gamelin’s departure.[108]

War was now inevitable, and during the five years of bloody conflict that followed, Miamitown was the principal goal of the American forces. As early as 1784, Washington had confided in his future Secretary of War, Henry Knox, that the establishment of a strong post at Miamitown was desirable for the welfare of the new nation in the West.[109] The following year, Washington wrote to Richard Henry Lee for the benefit of the Continental Congress, advocating a strong western policy. In his letter Washington said:

Would it not be worthy of the wisdom and the attention of congress to have the western waters well explored, the navigation of them fully ascertained, and accurately laid down, ... at least as far westerly as the Miamis running into the Ohio [the Great Miami] and Lake Erie [the Maumee] ... for I cannot forbear observing that the Miami village points to an important post for the Union.[110]

St. Clair, while in Philadelphia during 1790, talked to both Secretary of War, Henry Knox and President Washington, and suggested that an American fort be established on the site of Miamitown.[111] Writing to Knox on November 26, 1790, St. Clair again urged that General Harmar in the forthcoming campaign be empowered to carry out this plan, concluding his argument by saying, “we [will] never have peace with the Western Nations until we have a garrison there.”[112] Knox, after conferring with Washington, rejected the idea. In doing so, he wrote to the disappointed St. Clair, the following explanation:

In contemplating the establishment of military posts northwest of the Ohio, to answer the purposes of awing the Indians residing on the Wabash, the west end of Lake Erie, St. Joseph’s, and the Illinois ... and, at the same time, exhibiting a respectable appearance to the British troops at Detroit and Niagara, the Miami village presents itself as superior to any other position. This opinion was given to me by the President in the year 1784, and has several times been held forth by me to Brigadier Harmar. But at the same time, it must be acknowledged that the measure would involve a much larger military establishment than perhaps the value of the object or disposition of the United States would admit, and that it would be so opposed to the inclinations of the Indians generally ... as to bring on inevitably an Indian war of some duration. In addition to which, it is supposed that the British garrison would find themselves so uneasy with such a force impending over them as not only to occasion a considerable reinforcement of their upper posts, but also fomenting ... the opposition of the Indians.[113]

It would appear that the government did not wish to offend Great Britain, a policy which was not too strong perhaps, but one that kept the young republic at peace at a crucial time in her history. The proposed attack on Miamitown had to be under the guise of punishing the Indians. To do this and retire was permissible, but the establishment of an American fort there would have been considered by the British as a dagger pointed at Detroit. Consequently, when Harmar finally moved from Fort Washington with his army of 1,600 men, he had orders to destroy Miamitown and, if possible, its Indian occupants. Harmar himself promised that, in the event of a successful campaign, he would attend to “the villanous traders”.[114] Interestingly the British officials at Detroit and Canada believed that Harmar fully intended to build a fort at Miamitown although they expressed surprise at the “imprudence” of such action. Their spies, such as the Girties and Alexander McKee, kept them well informed of the strength and movement of Harmar’s army. They even noted Harmar’s tendency to be intoxicated.[115]

Forewarned by the British agents of the impending attack, the Indians adopted a “scorched earth” policy. The traders were forced to give their stores of ammunition to the Indians and were aided in fleeing with what goods they could carry. What was not destroyed by the Indians at Miamitown was burned by the Americans (20,000 bushels of corn, among other things). In two major engagements, the first at Hellar’s Corners, eight miles north of Miamitown, and the second, a three-pronged attack within the heart of the village and on the banks of the Maumee and St. Joseph rivers, the Indian forces, under Little Turtle, were victorious.[116] Although their crops and towns were destroyed and the trade ruined, the Indians were elated over their victories, and their frontier raids continued.

Knox now felt that, despite possible British disapproval, the only means of checking the Indians was to establish the fort at Miamitown for which St. Clair had asked. To carry this out, the Secretary of War asked Congress to increase the size of the army. The force contemplated for the intended post was 1,000 to 1,200 men. St. Clair argued that a strong fort at Miamitown “would curb the Wabash Indians, as well as the Ottawas and Chippewas, and all other northern tribes”; that it would “more effectually cover the line of frontier along the Ohio, than by a post any other place whatever (excluding Detroit)”; and “would afford more fully security to the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio.”[117] For an economy-minded Congress, he pointed out that “it would assist in the reduction of the national debt, by holding out security to people to purchase and settle the public lands.”[118]