When the transactions of the siege of Lilybæum, and the loss of part of the forces, were known at Rome, the citizens, so far from desponding at this ill news, seemed to be fired with new vigour.[690] Every man strove to be foremost in the muster roll; so that, in a very little time, an army of ten thousand men was raised, who, crossing the strait, marched by land to join the besiegers.
A.M. 3756. A. Rom. 500.
At the same time, P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, formed a design of attacking Adherbal in Drepanum.[691] He thought himself sure of surprising him, because, after the loss lately sustained by the Romans at Lilybæum, the enemy could not imagine that they would venture out again at sea. Flushed with these hopes, he sailed out with his fleet in the night, the better to conceal his design. But he had to do with an active general, whose vigilance he could not elude, and who did not even give him time to draw up his ships in line of battle, but fell vigorously upon him whilst his fleet was in disorder and confusion. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory. Of the Roman fleet, only thirty vessels got off, which being in company with the consul, fled with him, and got away in the best manner they could along the coast. All the rest, amounting to fourscore and thirteen, with the men on board them, were taken by the Carthaginians; a few soldiers excepted, who had escaped from the wreck of their vessels. This victory displayed as much the prudence and valour of Adherbal, as it reflected shame and ignominy on the Roman consul.
Junius, his colleague, was neither more prudent nor more fortunate than himself, but lost his whole fleet by his ill conduct.[692] Endeavouring to atone for his misfortune by some [pg 174] considerable action, he held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of Eryx,[693] and by that means got the city surrendered to him. On the summit of the mountain stood the temple of Venus Erycina, which was certainly the most beautiful as well as the richest of all the Sicilian temples. The city stood a little below the summit of this mountain, and the only access to it was by a road very long and very rugged. Junius posted one part of his troops upon the top, and the remainder at the foot of the mountain, imagining that he now had nothing to fear; but Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the famous Hannibal, found means to get into the city, which lay between the two camps of the enemy, and there fortified himself. From this advantageous post he harassed the Romans incessantly for two years. One can scarce conceive how it was possible for the Carthaginians to defend themselves, when thus attacked from both the summit and foot of the mountain; and unable to get provisions, but from a little port, which was the only one open to them. By such enterprises as these, the abilities and prudent courage of a general, are as well, or perhaps better discovered, than by the winning of a battle.
For five years, nothing memorable was performed on either side.[694] The Romans had imagined that their land forces would alone be capable of finishing the siege of Lilybæum: but as they saw it protracted beyond their expectation, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts to fit out a new fleet. The public treasury was at a low ebb; but this want was supplied by the zeal of individuals; so ardent was the love which the Romans bore their country. Every man, according to his circumstances, contributed to the common expense; and, upon public security, advanced money, without the least scruple, for an expedition on which the glory and safety of Rome depended. One man fitted out a ship at his own charge; another was equipped by the contributions of two or three; so that, in a very little time, two hundred were ready for sailing.
A.M. 3763. A. Rom. 507.
The command was given to Lutatius the consul, who immediately put to sea. [pg 175] The enemy's fleet had retired into Africa: the consul therefore easily seized upon all the advantageous posts in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum; and foreseeing that he should soon be forced to fight, he omitted no precautions to ensure success; and employed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea.
He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to Drepanum. His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops, and take Barca on board to assist him in the expected engagement. But the consul, suspecting his intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces, sailed for the small island Ægusa,[695] which lay near the other. He acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the morrow. Accordingly, at daybreak, he prepared to engage: unfortunately the wind was favourable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should give him battle. But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action; and, besides, would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barca he came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made directly to the enemy. The consul had choice forces, able seamen, and excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken from the enemy; and which was the completest in its kind that had ever been seen. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these advantages. As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and the Romans did not once dare to face them, they held them in the highest contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible. On the first report of the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution, or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This soon appeared in the engagement. They could not sustain the first [pg 176] attack. Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews. The rest, favoured by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed. There were upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners. The consul sailed immediately for Lilybæum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers.
When the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected. The senate, however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable to continue the war. As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions, or reinforcements, to the armies in Sicily. An express was therefore immediately despatched to Barca, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper. Barca, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage and the most consummate wisdom. But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to the consul, in order to treat about a peace. “Prudence,” says Polybius, “consists in knowing how to resist and yield at a seasonable juncture.” Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which had attended on Regulus's inexorable and imprudent obstinacy, were fresh in his memory. He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the following treaty.
There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (in case the Roman people approve of it) on the following conditions: The Carthaginians shall evacuate all Sicily; shall no longer make war upon Hiero, the Syracusans, or their allies: They shall restore to the Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners which they have taken from them; and pay them, within twenty years, two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver.[696] It is worth the reader's [pg 177] remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which this treaty is expressed; that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests of two powerful republics and their allies, both by sea and land.