They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that [pg 213] of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.
In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;[753] for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,[754] defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.
Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.[755] For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.
The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,[756] whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of [pg 214] all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.
Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.[757] He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
A.M. 3788. A. Rom. 532.
At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed consuls.[758] Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already as far as Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as soon as possible. Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though the most troublesome, nay, almost impassable, by reason of a fen which he was forced to go through. Here the army suffered incredible hardships. During four days and three nights they marched halfway up the leg in water, and, consequently, could not get a moment's sleep. Hannibal himself, who rode upon the only elephant he had left, could hardly get through. His long want of sleep, and the thick vapours which exhaled from that marshy place, together with the unhealthiness of the season, cost him one of his eyes.
Battle of Thrasymenus.[759]—Hannibal being thus got, almost [pg 215] unexpectedly, out of this dangerous situation, and having refreshed his troops, marched and pitched his camp between Arretium and Fesulæ, in the richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. His first endeavours were, to discover the disposition of Flaminius, in order that he might take advantage of his weak side, which, according to Polybius, ought to be the chief study of a general. He was told, that Flaminius was greatly conceited of his own merit, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of glory. To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was naturally prone,[760] he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and burning the whole country in his sight.
Flaminius was not of a temper to continue inactive in his camp, even if Hannibal had lain still. But when he saw the territories of his allies laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonour upon him, should he suffer Hannibal to ransack Italy without control, and even advance to the very walls of Rome without meeting any resistance. He rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait the arrival of his colleague, and to be satisfied, for the present, with putting a stop to the devastation of the enemy.
In the mean time, Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right. When he saw that the consul followed close after him, with design to give him battle, in order to stop him in his march; having observed that the ground was convenient for an engagement, he thought only of making preparations for it. The lake Thrasymenus and the mountains of Cortona form a very narrow defile, which leads into a large valley, lined on both sides with hills of a considerable height, and closed, at the outlet, by a steep hill of difficult access. On this hill, Hannibal, after having crossed the valley, came and encamped with the main body of his army; posting his light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills on the right, and part of his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost as the entrance of the defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pass. Accordingly, this general, who followed him very eagerly with the resolution to fight him, being come to [pg 216] the defile near the lake, was forced to halt, because night was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.