Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two generals.
The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight skirmishes. But, at last, one day, when Varro had the command, (for the two consuls took it by turns,) preparations were made on both sides for battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct [pg 224] of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost.
Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice: “Return, then,” says he, “thanks to the gods for having brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph over them; and thank me also, for having reduced the Romans to a necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great successive victories, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to inspire you with courage? By the former battles, you are become masters of the open country; but this will put you in possession of all the cities, and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but action. I trust in the gods, that you shall soon see my promises verified.”
The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius commanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so as that the wind Vulturnus,[768] which rises at certain stated times, should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy-armed foot on their right, and half on their left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry; and having drawn them out of the line, advanced to give battle, rounding his front as he drew nearer the enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half moon, in order that he might leave no interval between his main body and the [pg 225] rest of the line, which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their posts.
The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank. Hannibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers; and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line. The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans, who were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and attacked them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken and scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep them from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot was all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. Æmilius being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with him two quæstors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been either consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year's consuls; Minucius, the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle;[769] and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury,[770] did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, called out to them several times; “Stop, soldiers, spare the vanquished.” Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the consul retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the [pg 226] neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse.
Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that within five days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an affair which required mature deliberation; “I see,” replies Maharbal, “that the gods have not endowed the same man with all talents. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory.”[771]
It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, as being guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They, besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first assault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in not attempting to put it in execution.
And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could [pg 227] remain but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus, miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;[772] and soon after the battle of Cannæ, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,[773] of no note, and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.
Soon after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.[774] Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out, in the middle of the senate, a bushel[775] of gold rings, which had been taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy; upon which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal, fancying he had now a fair opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the contrary faction, asked him, whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered [pg 228] up to them? Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so much boasted (supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in proportion as they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he then undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. “I have cut to pieces,” says he (continuing Mago's speech,) “the Roman armies: send me some troops.—What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have twice seized upon the enemy's camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of every kind.—Send me provisions and money.—Could you have talked otherwise had you lost your camp?” He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: “I then perceive,” replied Hanno, “that we are no farther advanced, than when Hannibal first landed in Italy.” The inference he drew from hence was, that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal's faction prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno's remonstrances, which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and, accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the supplies of men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain, to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in that country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to another quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of a general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,[776] who had fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; at Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being victorious. But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus being more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to the Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and to render of no avail that which had been already gained.
Hannibal takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua.[777]—The battle of Cannæ subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over to his interest Græcia Magna,[778] with the city of Tarentum; and thus wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to great wealth and power. Luxury, and a fondness for pleasure, (the usual attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who, from their natural inclination, were but too much inclined to voluptuousness and excess.