A.M. 3798. A. Rom. 542.
The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal.[795]—One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity's sake,) were C. Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal.
The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important a [pg 236] nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules[796] of his duty, for the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it are thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state. Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by thirty-five thousand men?
Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design. When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that, in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.
They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The army of Porcius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for [pg 237] battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul. This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his assistance.
After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random, along the banks of the river Metaurus,[797] and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and was the first to march to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties. Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.
This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had [pg 238] fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,[798] and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand. These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: “It is fit,” says he, “that some should survive, in order that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians.”
Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the engagement. Through every place where he passed, in his return, shouts of joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: “All is over,” says he,[799] “I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune.” He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.
A.M. 3799. A. Rom. 543.
Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into Africa. Hannibal is recalled.[800]—The fate of arms was not more propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been [pg 239] defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.