After all, says Plutarch, in the passage which I have already cited, of what utility have these tragedies been to Athens, though so much boasted by the people, and admired by the rest of the world? I find that the prudence of Themistocles enclosed the city with strong walls; that the fine taste and magnificence of Pericles improved and adorned it; that the noble fortitude of Miltiades preserved its liberty; and that the moderate conduct of Cimon acquired it the empire and government of all Greece. If the wise and learned poetry of Euripides, the sublime diction of Sophocles, the lofty buskin of Æschylus, have obtained equal advantages for the city of Athens, by delivering it from impending calamities, or by adding to its glory, I am willing (he goes on) that dramatic pieces should be placed in competition with trophies of victory, the poetic theatre with the field of battle, and the compositions of the poets with the great exploits of the generals. But what a [pg ciii] comparison would this be? On the one side would be seen a few writers, crowned with wreaths of ivy, and dragging a goat or an ox after them, the rewards and victims assigned them for excelling in tragic poetry: on the other, a train of illustrious captains, surrounded by the colonies which they founded, the cities which they captured, and the nations which they subjected. It is not to perpetuate the victories of Æschylus and Sophocles, but in remembrance of the glorious battles of Marathon, Salamis, Eurymedon, and many others, that so many feasts are celebrated every month with such pomp by the Grecians.

The inference which Plutarch draws from hence, in which we ought to agree with him, is,[220] that it was the highest imprudence in the Athenians thus to prefer pleasure to duty, fondness for the theatre to the love of their country, trivial shows to application to public business, and to consume, in useless expenses and dramatic entertainments, the funds intended for the support of fleets and armies. Macedon, till then obscure and inconsiderable, well knew how to take advantage of the Athenian indolence and effeminacy;[221] and Philip, instructed by the Greeks themselves, amongst whom he had for several years applied himself successfully to the art of war, was not long before he gave Greece a master, and subjected it to the yoke, as we shall see in the sequel.

I am now to open an entirely new scene to the reader's view, not unworthy his curiosity and attention. We have seen two states of no great consideration, Media and Persia, extend themselves far and wide, under the conduct of Cyrus, like a torrent or a conflagration; and, with amazing rapidity, conquer and subdue many provinces and kingdoms. We shall see now that vast empire setting the nations under its dominion in motion, the Persians, Medes, Phœnicians, Egyptians, Babylonians, Indians, and many others; and falling, with all the forces of Asia and the East upon a little country, of very small extent, and destitute of all foreign assistance; I mean Greece. When, on the one hand, we behold so many nations united together, such preparations of war made for several years with so much diligence; innumerable armies by sea and land, and such fleets as the sea could hardly contain; and, on the other [pg civ] hand, two weak cities, Athens and Lacedæmon, abandoned by all their allies, and left almost entirely to themselves; have we not reason to believe, that these two little cities are going to be utterly destroyed and swallowed up by so formidable an enemy; and that no footsteps of them will be left remaining? And yet we shall find that they will prove victorious; and by their invincible courage, and the several battles they gain, both by sea and land, will make the Persian empire lay aside all thoughts of ever again turning their arms against Greece.

The history of the war between the Persians and the Greeks will illustrate the truth of this maxim, that it is not the number, but the valour of the troops, and the conduct of the generals, on which depends the success of military expeditions. The reader will admire the surprising courage and intrepidity of the great men at the head of the Grecian affairs, whom neither all the world in motion against them could deject, nor the greatest misfortunes disconcert; who undertook, with an handful of men, to make head against innumerable armies; who, notwithstanding such a prodigious inequality of forces, dared to hope for success; who even compelled victory to declare on the side of merit and virtue; and taught all succeeding generations what infinite resources are to be found in prudence, valour, and experience; in a zeal for liberty and our country; in the love of our duty; and in all the sentiments of noble and generous souls.

This war of the Persians against the Grecians will be followed by another amongst the Greeks themselves, but of a very different kind from the former. In the latter, there will scarce be any actions, but what in appearance are of little consequence, and seemingly unworthy of a reader's curiosity who is fond of great events; in this he will meet with little besides private quarrels between certain cities, or some small commonwealths; some inconsiderable sieges, (excepting that of Syracuse, one of the most important related in ancient history,) though several of these sieges were of no short duration; some battles between armies, where the numbers were small, and but little blood shed. What is it, then, that has rendered these wars so famous in history? Sallust informs us in these words: “The actions of the Athenians doubtless were great; and yet I believe they were somewhat less than fame will have us conceive of them. [pg cv] But because Athens abounded in noble writers, the acts of that republic are celebrated throughout the whole world as most glorious; and the gallantry of those heroes who performed them, has had the good fortune to be thought as transcendent as the eloquence of those who have described them.”[222]

Sallust, though jealous enough of the glory the Romans had acquired by a series of distinguished actions, with which their history abounds, yet does justice in this passage to the Grecians, by acknowledging, that their exploits were truly great and illustrious, though somewhat inferior, in his opinion, to their fame. What is then this foreign and borrowed lustre, which the Athenian actions have derived from the eloquence of their historians? It is, that the whole universe agrees in looking upon them as the greatest and most glorious that ever were performed: Per terrarum orbem Atheniensium facta pro maximis celebrantur. All nations, seduced and enchanted as it were with the beauties of the Greek authors, think that people's exploits superior to any thing that was ever done by any other nation. This, according to Sallust, is the service which the Greek authors have done the Athenians, by their excellent manner of describing their actions; and very unhappy it is for us, that our history, for want of similar assistance, has left a thousand brilliant actions and fine sayings unrecorded, which would have been put in the strongest light by the writers of antiquity, and have done great honour to our country.

But, be this as it may, it must be confessed, that we are not always to judge of the value of an action, or the merit of the persons who shared in it, by the importance of the event. It is rather in such sieges and engagements as we find recorded in the history of the Peloponnesian war, that the conduct and abilities of a general are truly conspicuous. Accordingly, it is observed, that it was chiefly at the head of small armies, and in countries of no great extent, that our best generals of the last age displayed their great capacity, and showed themselves not inferior to the most celebrated captains of antiquity. In actions of this sort chance has no share, and does not cover any oversights that are committed. Every thing is conducted and carried on by the prudence of the general. He is truly the soul of the forces, which neither act nor move but by his direction. He sees every thing, and is present every where. Nothing escapes his vigilance and attention. Orders are seasonably given, and seasonably executed. Contrivances, stratagems, false marches, real or feigned attacks, encampments, decampments; in a word, every thing depends upon him alone.

On this account, the reading of the Greek historians, such [pg cvi] as Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, is of infinite service to young officers; because those historians, who were also excellent commanders, enter into all the particulars of the events which they relate, and lead the readers, as it were by the hand, through all the sieges and battles they describe; showing them, by the example of the greatest generals of antiquity, and by a kind of anticipated experience, in what manner war is to be carried on.

Nor is it only with regard to military exploits, that the Grecian history affords us such excellent models. We shall there find celebrated legislators, able politicians, magistrates born for government, men that have excelled in all arts and sciences, philosophers that carried their inquiries as far as was possible in those early ages, and who have left us such maxims of morality, as might put many Christians to the blush.

If the virtues of those who are celebrated in history may serve us for models in the conduct of our lives; their vices and failings, on the other hand, are no less proper to caution and instruct us; and the strict regard which an historian is obliged to pay to truth will not allow him to dissemble the latter, through fear of eclipsing the lustre of the former. Nor does what I here advance contradict the rule laid down by Plutarch, on the same subject, in his preface to the life of Cimon.[223] He requires, that the illustrious actions of great men be represented in their full light; but as to the faults, which may sometimes escape them through passion or surprise, or into which they may be drawn by the necessity of affairs, considering them rather as a certain degree of perfection wanting to their virtue,[224] than as vices or crimes that proceed from any corruption of the heart; such imperfections as these, he would have the historian, out of compassion to the weakness of human nature, which produces nothing entirely perfect, content himself with touching very lightly; in the same manner as an able painter, when he has a fine face to draw, in which he finds some little blemish or defect, does neither entirely suppress it, nor think himself obliged to represent it with a strict exactness, because the one would spoil the beauty of the picture, and the other would destroy the likeness. The very comparison Plutarch uses, shows, that he speaks only of slight and excusable faults. But as to actions of injustice, violence, and brutality, they ought not to be concealed or disguised on any pretence; nor can we suppose, that the same privilege should be allowed in [pg cvii] history as is in painting, which invented the profile, to represent the side-face of a prince who had lost an eye, and by that means ingeniously concealed so disagreeable a deformity.[225] History, the most essential rule of which is sincerity, will by no means admit of such indulgences, as indeed would deprive it of its greatest advantage.