"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better. You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."
On March 2nd he telegraphed:—
"I have no option about staying at Khartoum; it has passed out of my hands, and as to sending a larger force than 200, I do not think it necessary to Wady Halfa. It is not the number, but the prestige which I need. I am sure the revolt will collapse if I can say that I have British troops at my back."
On the 5th Sir Evelyn Baring wrote to Lord Granville:—
"General Gordon has on several occasions pressed for 200 British troops to be sent to Wady Halfa. I agree with the military authorities in thinking that it would not be desirable to comply with this request."
On March 11th Lord Granville replied to Gordon's urgent entreaties that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to send troops to Berber."
Sir Evelyn Baring, who had opposed the despatch of troops to Wady Halfa and to Berber, on March 16th recognized the necessity for action. On that day he telegraphed home:—
"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Souakim and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum."
But Lord Granville still felt unable to authorize an advance of British troops.
On March 24th Sir E. Baring telegraphed:—