The news of the loss of the Abbas was a terrible blow to Gordon, and although at the time he knew nothing certain as to the fate of those on board, yet he feared treachery. Many of his anticipations as to the ultimate fall of Khartoum and other events were prophetic; and although he did not foresee the exact circumstances of the loss of the Abbas, he foresaw the fate of Stewart and those with him. After he heard that the Abbas had been captured, but had received no information as to the circumstances of the loss, he writes:—
"Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in prospective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it). I can see, in imagination, the whole scene, the Sheikh inviting them to land, saying, 'Thank God, the Mahdi is a liar!'—bringing in wood—men going on shore and dispersed. The Abbas with her steam down, then a rush of wild Arabs and all is over!"
Throughout the journals reference is made to various important documents, the most notable of which is a letter from the Mahdi to Gordon, dated 2nd Moharrem, 1302 (22nd October, 1884). In it the writer says:—
"We have now arrived at a day's journey from Omdurman, and are coming, please God, to your place. If you return to the Most High God, and become a Moslem, and surrender to His order and that of His Prophet, and believe in us as the Mahdi, send us a message after laying down your arms and giving up all thought of fighting, so that I may send you some one with safe-conduct, by which you will obtain (assurance of) benefit and blessing in this world and the next. Otherwise, and if you do not act thus, you will have to encounter war with God and His Prophet. And know that the Most High God is mighty for your destruction, as He has destroyed others before you, who were much stronger than you, and more numerous."
In reply, Gordon sent a telegram to the Commandant of Omdurman, to be communicated to the Mahdi, with the memorable words "I am like iron, and hope yet to see the English arrive."
The following passages record some of the later incidents of the siege:—
"12th November, 10.20 a.m.—For half an hour firing lulled, but then recommenced, and is still going on. The Ismailia was struck with a shell, but I hear is not seriously damaged. The Husseinyeh is aground (I feel much the want of my other steamers at Metammeh). 11.15 a.m.—Firing has lulled; it was very heavy for the last three-quarters of an hour from Ismailia and Arabs. It is now desultory, and is dying away. Husseinyeh is still aground; the Ismailia is at anchor. What a six hours' anxiety for me when I saw the shells strike the water near the steamers from the Arabs; imagine my feelings! Noon.—The firing has ceased, I am glad to say. I have lived years in these last hours! Had I lost the Ismailia I should have lost the Husseinyeh (aground), and then Omdurman and the North Fort, and then the town. One p.m.—The Arabs are firing on the steamers with their two guns. The Husseinyeh still aground; that is the reason of it. 1.30 p.m.—Now has ceased. The Ismailia, struck by three shells, had one man killed, fifteen wounded on board of her; she did really very well. This is our first encounter with the Mahdi's personal troops. 2.45 p.m.—The Ismailia tried to take Husseinyeh off and got struck twice, in addition to the three times before mentioned, with shells, so she desisted from the attempt. The Arabs are firing on the Husseinyeh. I have ordered the Krupp of (Fort) Mogrim to play on the Arab guns, and shall wait till night to take off the Husseinyeh. She is nearer to the left bank than to the right bank. It is not clear if she is aground or half sunk (equally a trouble). 3.30 p.m.—The Arabs are bringing their guns nearer to the aground or half-sunken Husseinyeh. The Ismailia reports that the two last shells have done her no material damage. 4.30 p.m.—The Arabs have now three guns bearing on the Husseinyeh. Six p.m.—The firing has ceased. I hope to get the Husseinyeh off to-night. Seven p.m.—The Arabs keep up a dropping fire on the Husseinyeh, who, I hear, has two shell holes in her, and has six men, including the captain, wounded.
"22nd November.—I am terribly anxious for the fort at Omdurman, and am trying to devise some means of occupying the Arabs and diverting their attention elsewhere.... The Arab camps are about five miles from the city.
"5th December.—I have almost given up an idea of saving the town; it is a last resource we make to open the route to the Omdurman Fort.
"6th December.—I have given up all idea of landing at Omdurman; we have not the force to do it. The Arabs fired forty-five rounds at (Fort) Mogrim and the steamers. We had two men wounded at Mogrim and one killed. This is most distressing, to have these poor fellows wounded and killed.
"13th December.—The steamers went up and attacked Arabs at Buri. Certainly this day after day delay has a most disheartening effect on every one. To-day is the two hundred and seventy-sixth day of our anxiety. The Arabs appear to have suffered to-day heavily at Buri.... We are going to send down the Bordein the day after to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. If some effort is not made before ten days' time, the town will fall. It is inexplicable this delay. If the expeditionary forces have reached the river, and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we require just to show themselves."
The latest entry in the Diaries is on 14th December, and is as follows:—
"Arabs fired two shells at the Palace this morning: 546 ardebs dhoora in store; also 83,525 okes of biscuits. 10.30 a.m.—The steamers are down at Omdurman engaging the Arabs. Consequently I am on 'tenterhooks.' 11.30 a.m.—Steamers returned. The Bordein was struck by a shell in her battery. We had only one man wounded. We are going to send down the Bordein to-morrow with this journal. If I was in command of the two hundred men of the expeditionary force, which are all that is necessary for the movement, I should stop just below Halfiyeh and attack the Arabs at that place before I came on here to Khartoum. I should then communicate with the North Fort, and act according to circumstances. Now, mark this, if the expeditionary force—and I ask for no more than two hundred men—does not come in ten days the town may fall, and I have done my best for the honour of our country. Good-bye.
"C. G. Gordon."
It would be impossible to find words more simple and at the same time more pathetic than those contained in the concluding sentences of the man who so long held the attention of the world riveted upon him, and who, unaided and alone, maintained the highest traditions of British courage and fortitude.