As it happened, the column at Gubat was not in a condition to advance, and the Mahdi, knowing that at the worst he had only the two steamers to reckon with, determined to risk an assault.
The responsibility for the disaster may be traced partly to the insufficient supply of camels to the Desert Column, owing to which Stewart, instead of pushing on at first straight across the Bayuda desert, was compelled to return from Gakdul Wells to Korti, and then make a fresh start, thus losing twelve days' valuable time. But after all, the main responsibility will always rest with the Government which so long delayed despatching the Relief Expedition, and then, as if to make its failure the more certain, sent it by the wrong route.
CHAPTER XLV.
THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT.
The result of the taking of Khartoum was naturally to increase the renown of the Mahdi to a greater extent than ever in the Moslem world. His fame as a conqueror spread not only throughout the Soudan, but also in the towns and villages of Upper and Lower Egypt. Many of those who before had disbelieved in him, now became fully assured of his holy mission. Had he at once followed up his success by an advance down the Nile, the consequences to the British forces at Gubat and elsewhere might have been disastrous. As it was, he contented himself with staying with his followers in the neighbourhood of Khartoum, the pillaging of which no doubt afforded an agreeable relaxation after a long and arduous siege.
With Khartoum in the Mahdi's power, the whole situation was changed. His army instead of being concentrated before Khartoum, was set free to strike a blow at any point which he might think opportune for attack.
Not merely was the small force at Gubat in danger, but Wolseley's entire army was at this period divided and split up in fragments. One of these was at Gubat, in immediate proximity to the fortified town of Metammeh held by a superior force. Another was isolated near Kirbekan, where the enemy were reported to be in considerable strength; whilst a third remained with Wolseley at the head-quarters at Korti. In addition detachments were scattered across the Bayuda desert at the different points of communication.
Though at first the capture of Metammeh and operations against Berber were contemplated, the question of the relief of Khartoum gradually resolved itself into the problem of extricating "The Relief Expedition" itself. Opinions differed greatly how this was to be effected. Some were in favour of the immediate retreat of the desert column to Korti. Others considered a march across the desert of so small a force, with the prospect of encountering hordes of Mahdists from Khartoum, anything but a safe operation. Other advisers were in favour of concentrating the whole of the expeditionary force on the capture of Berber and holding that place until the arrival of reinforcements from India or from home landed at Souakim, should either insure the safe retreat of the force, or allow of the recapture of Khartoum. That which was done will appear later.
During the absence of Sir Charles Wilson, the British force in the neighbourhood of Gubat, under Colonel Boscawen, was employed in improving and strengthening the works there. A triangular fort was erected, and earthworks with flanking trenches and parapets were thrown up both on the land side and towards Metammeh. Brushwood and wire entanglements were placed outside to impede the enemy in the event of their attempting to storm the position, and, in fact, every preparation was made to stand a siege.
Although an attack was constantly expected, the enemy, beyond beating tom-toms all night and making a parade every day, did nothing.