With a view to carrying out the plan of holding the river as indicated, Wolseley now sent orders to Earle's Nile Column, to stop the advance upon Berber and to return to Merawi.
On the 21st, Lord Hartington asked Wolseley if anything more could be done for supplies for the summer.
Lord Wolseley replied on the 22nd as follows:—
"When I have concentrated my force on this part of the Nile, I have no fear for my communications, so I do not want any more troops here now. It is important to thoroughly crush Osman Digna, and restore peace to the country now under his influence, in order to push forward the railway, and, by a brilliant success near Souakim, make the Soudanese realize what they must expect when we move forward in the autumn."
Wolseley's views on the military situation, and on the operations to be conducted, were communicated to Lord Hartington in a despatch dated 6th March, 1885, from which the following is an extract:—
"In reply to my telegram, your Lordship informed me that my immediate duty was to protect the province of Dongola—the only province of the Soudan which is still clear of the enemy—and that, as soon as the necessary arrangements could be completed, Her Majesty's Government had determined to destroy the Mahdi's power at Khartoum, in order that peace, order, and a settled government might be established there. This I conceive to be in general terms a fair description of the new mission with which I have been intrusted, and which I shall endeavour to carry out next autumn.
"I take this opportunity of congratulating Her Majesty's Government upon having adopted the Nile route as the line of advance for this force on Khartoum. Had this army been despatched from Souakim as a base, and upon arrival at, or near, Berber, learnt that Khartoum had fallen, it could not possibly have transferred its base to the Mediterranean, for it could not have been fed under those circumstances in this part of the Nile Valley. The province of Dongola would have been at the enemy's mercy, and the frontiers of Egypt would have been open to his attack.
"As it is impossible for me to undertake any offensive operations until about the end of summer, it is important that in the meanwhile Osman Digna's power in the Souakim district should be crushed. The defeat will, in some measure, act as a counterpoise to the Mahdi's capture of Khartoum. This operation is not difficult, as the forces are near the seaboard, and it should be immediately followed by the occupation of the Tokar and Sinkat districts. A railway should also be begun without delay at Souakim in the direction of Berber. Your Lordship has informed me that a contract has been entered into for the construction of this railway on a gauge of 4 ft. 8-1/2 inches.
"Although I do not for a moment entertain the idea that a railway of such a gauge can be completed over the 250 miles (about) of country lying between Souakim and Berber in time to have any very direct or immediate effect upon our operations towards Khartoum next autumn, I am convinced that active progress made upon it will bring home to Mohammed Ahmed, and to all intelligent Sheikhs, the fact that we are now in earnest, and do not mean to leave the country until we have re-established order and a settled government at Khartoum.
"I am now engaged in distributing the army along the left bank of the Nile on the open reach of water that extends from the Hanneck Cataract to Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. There I shall be quite prepared to meet Mohammed Ahmed at any time during the summer, should he, by any good fortune, be tempted to advance in this direction. During the summer I shall collect the supplies which this army will require for its advance in the autumn. The railway from Souakim to Berber would take about two years and five months to complete."
In reading this despatch it will be seen that Wolseley lays stress upon the necessity of crushing Osman Digna's force at Souakim. He also recommends the immediate construction of the Souakim-Berber railway. But on the 20th February instructions had already been given to Graham to effect both these objects. Of this Wolseley was fully aware at the time, and it strikes one as singular that so late in the day he should be found advising the Government to take two steps which had already been decided on.
Further, it will be noticed that his Lordship, whilst approving of the construction of the railway (which he reckons would require two years and five months) is careful to point out that he does not for a moment entertain the idea that it could be constructed in time to have any direct or immediate effect upon the operations towards Khartoum, to be undertaken in the autumn.
Another singular feature in the despatch is the complacency with which his Lordship, after the total failure of the expedition by way of the Nile, congratulates the Government on having chosen that route.
The difficulties in the way of further operations during the summer now began to be apparent. The hot weather had set in at Korti. The thermometer on the 5th March registered 104 degrees under the shade of the trees. Later on it went up two degrees higher still. The wind blowing from the desert was like a blast from a furnace. Under these conditions the tents with which the soldiers were provided offered little or no protection. Sickness, too, began to break out, and several cases of enteric fever were reported.