The Government at this time had fully made up their minds to withdraw from the Soudan altogether as early as possible.
Wolseley, on the other hand, was anxious that before this step should be finally taken, the Mahdi should be crushed once for all, and in a very able despatch, dated the 16th April, set forth his views.
The document, which reads very like a protest against the policy of the Gladstone Cabinet, omitting some passages, is as follows:—
"Both from a military and financial point of view, and also with regard to the general well-being of Egypt proper, the growing power of the Mahdi must be met, not by a purely defensive policy on the frontier, whether at Assouan or Wady Halfa, but by his overthrow in the neighbourhood of Khartoum."
The despatch concludes:—
"To sum up. The struggle with the Mahdi, or rather, perhaps, with Mahdi-ism, must come sooner or later. We can accept it now, and have done with it once and for all, or we can allow all the military reputation we have gained at the cost of so much toil and hard fighting, all the bloodshed and all the expenditure of the past campaign, to go for nothing, and try and stave the final struggle off for a few years. These years will be years of trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burden and strain to our military resources, and the contest that will come in the end will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive policy."
The Afghan question still troubled the Ministry, and on the 20th April Lord Hartington telegraphed that the "Government were about to announce that it was necessary to hold all the military resources of the Empire, including the forces in the Soudan, available for service wherever required. The Government would not," he said, "therefore make provision for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for military preparations for an early advance on Khartoum, beyond such as could not be stopped with advantage, and did not involve hostile action, viz., river steamboats contracted for, and the completion of the Wady Halfa Railway. As to ulterior steps, the Government reserved their liberty of action. With the cessation of active operations on the Nile, any considerable extension of the Souakim-Berber Railway was to be suspended; but as Souakim must be held for the present, it might be necessary to occupy one or more stations in the neighbourhood, and the Government would retain a garrison in Egypt, and defend the frontier."
On the 23rd April Wolseley proposed that he should go to Souakim in order to form an opinion on the spot as to the points which it would be desirable to hold.
This was approved by the Government, and on the 24th Wolseley communicated the arrangements made for the disposition of the Nile force in his absence as follows:—
"On 1st June, troops at Merawi start for Dongola, at which place and Abu Fatmeh I propose to concentrate force now up the Nile. This movement will be completed by 1st July.
"In the meantime, railway to Ferket will be in a forward state, and able to assist greatly in the movement of troops and Civil Government officers on Wady Halfa. At present nearly all the troops are in huts; to move them in this present hot weather will be very trying to their health.
"When troops are concentrated at Dongola and Abu Fatmeh I shall expect orders before I move them to Wady Halfa."