German Problems and Personalities

by Charles Sarolea

IV.

And perhaps the readers may carry away the impression that Germany feels more than she thinks; that she is carried away by prejudice, by currents and cross-currents of emotion, rather than led by general principles and clear and sober thinking. I had asked one of the most eminent British publicists living to write an introduction to the English translation of M. Bourdon’s book which is to be published next month by Messrs. Dent. But my friend answered that he would willingly have written such an introduction if he could have agreed with the ideas of the French writer. Unfortunately, he did not see his way to agree with Monsieur Bourdon. No purpose, he argued, could be served by cross-examining German opinion, for there was no German opinion. In vain did Monsieur Bourdon claim to tell us what Germany thinks; the Germans were not educated to think politically. And there was the rub. There was no organized public opinion, and even if there were, it could only express itself, it could not press its demands upon a despotic Government.

V.

I do not here examine how much truth there may be in my friend’s contention. But one fact must certainly strike the readers of M. Bourdon’s book. The present position is as ominous as it is bewildering and unintelligible.

Monsieur Bourdon has proved once more the tremendous power of German militarism. German militarism seems to be bred in the bone of the Prussians, and has been inoculated into the German people. The army is the most popular service in the country. It provides an honourable career to tens of thousands of young men of the middle classes and of the aristocracy. At the same time, Monsieur Bourdon points out that from the German point of view it is one thing to be militarist, and another to be warlike and bellicose. The Germans hold that the most confirmed militarist may be a convinced pacifist. The father of Frederick the Great, the greatest militarist of the Hohenzollern Dynasty, the Sergeant-King, was so attached to his army that he never employed it in active warfare, he never allowed it to fight a single battle, for fear of losing or spoiling so perfect an instrument.

But even granting this paradoxical thesis of the pacifism of German militarists, the situation remains sufficiently contradictory and distracting to the ordinary mind. Every representative German consulted by Monsieur Bourdon proclaims that Germany is pacific, that she wishes for peace, and that she needs peace for her industrial and commercial expansion. Yet we see her making gigantic preparations for a possible war. With a restless endeavour, and at tremendous cost, we see her developing her warlike resources. Every representative German insists on making platonic professions. Yet we do not hear of a single statesman daring to take the necessary step or to make the necessary sacrifices. No one seems to understand that peace demands sacrifices quite as heroic as war. No Bismarck of peace seems to be strong enough to-day to put an end to the senseless waste of national resources and misdirected energies.

VI.

The “German Enigma” of Monsieur Bourdon is mainly an objective, impartial, and impersonal study, and the author has been careful not to obtrude his own private views. It is only in the last chapter that he attempts to draw the lesson and point out the conclusion of his own inquiry. And his conclusion is an eloquent though restrained plea for a Franco-German rapprochement, and in favour of the only policy which will bring about that reconciliation. France, he argues, does not want a revision of the Treaty of Frankfurt. She does not want compensation or revenge. French history contains a sufficiently brilliant roll of glorious military achievements that the French people may afford to forget the reverses and humiliations of 1870. A French statesman, on the eve of the Treaty of Frankfurt, made the rhetorical statement that France would never surrender one stone of her fortresses nor one inch of her territory. Animated by a very different spirit, modern French statesmen do not claim back to-day one inch of lost territory. All that the French people demand is that the claims of justice shall be heard, that Alsace-Lorraine shall cease to groan under the heel of an arbitrary despot, that Alsace-Lorraine shall be governed according to her own laws, that the Alsatians shall be treated as a free people, and not as conquered subjects.

VII.

And that one sole possibly solution is also the only simple solution. That solution would involve no sacrifice of pride or dignity to either nation. France would not make any surrender to Germany, and Germany would not make any concession to France. Both would surrender to the demands of international justice.