[11] The reader should distinguish the defensive operations at Château-Thierry, on the 1st of June, from the attack launched from this sector in July. Both are known as the battle of Château-Thierry.
The Allied line was now in a position to contest actively any deepening of the Marne salient to the west, and American troops had so clearly proved their quality that Pershing could with justice demand a radical revision of the Allied opinion that American soldiers were fit only for the defense. His confidence in their fighting capacity was soon further put to the test and vindicated. On the 15th of July the Germans opened the fourth and last of their great drives, with tremendous artillery fire from Rheims to the Marne. They hoped to capture the former, swing far to the south and west, and, if they failed to take Paris, at least to draw sufficient troops from Flanders and Picardy as to assure a successful drive on Amiens and the Channel Ports. For the first time, however, the element of surprise in their attack was lacking. At the eastern end of the battle-line General Gouraud, with whom were fighting the Forty-second Division and four colored regiments, warned of the moment of attack, withdrew his front lines and permitted the Germans to shell empty trenches; all important positions he held firmly. On the Marne, east of Château-Thierry, the enemy succeeded in crossing the river in the early morning. At various points the American line was compelled to yield, although one of the American regiments stood its ground while on either flank the Germans, who had gained a footing on the south bank, pressed forward; it was, according to Pershing's report, "one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals." At noon, heedless of the warning given by the French commander, American reinforcements launched a strong counter-attack and drove the enemy back to the river; on the next morning no Germans were to be found on the south bank in front of the American troops. During the next two days German efforts to press forward were unrelaxing but in vain, and on the 18th of July, Foch launched his counter-offensive.
The inherent weakness of the Marne salient from the German point of view and the opportunity which it offered the Allied command had not been forgotten by the generalissimo. Foch waited until the enemy had spent his strength in the attacks around Rheims and on the Marne, then struck fiercely between Soissons and Château-Thierry. The spearhead of the main drive was composed of the First and Second American Divisions, immediately to the south of Soissons, who were operating under Mangin with the First French Moroccan Division between them. Straightway, without the orthodox preliminary artillery fire, a deep thrust was made against the western side of the salient; near Soissons, despite fierce resistance, advances of from eight to ten kilometers and large numbers of prisoners were reported in the first twenty-four hours. "Due to the magnificent dash and powers displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions," said Pershing, "the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies." Further to the south, the Fourth and Twenty-sixth Divisions crossed the road running from Château-Thierry to Soissons, pushing east; while from the southern bank of the Marne, the Third Division pushed north across the river. It was obvious to the Germans that retreat from the perilous salient must proceed at once, especially as Franco-British counter-attacks on the eastern side threatened to close it at the neck and cut the main line of German withdrawal. The retreat was executed with great skill and valor. While holding on the sides, the enemy forces were slowly pulled back from the apex, striving to win time to save artillery, although they must perforce lose or destroy great quantities of ammunition. Against the retreating foe fresh American divisions were hurled. On the 25th of July the Forty-second division relieved the Twenty-sixth, advancing toward the Vesle, with elements of the Twenty-eighth, until relieved on August 3d, by the Fourth Division. Farther east the Thirty-second had relieved the Third. The Americans had to face withering fire from machine-gun nests and fight hand to hand in the crumbled streets of the Champagne villages. Here were carried on some of the fiercest conflicts of American military history. Finally on the 6th of August the Germans reached the line of the Vesle, their retreat secured, although their losses had been terrific. But the pause was only momentary. Before they could bring up replacements, the British launched their great drive south of the Somme, the American Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Seventy-seventh divisions crossed the Vesle pushing the Germans before them, and there began what Ludendorff in his memoirs calls "the last phase."
Pershing had not lost sight of his original object, which was to assemble the American divisions into a separate army. After the victories of July, which wiped out the Marne salient, and those of August, which put the enemy definitely on the defensive, he felt that "the emergency which had justified the dispersion of our divisions had passed." Soon after the successful British attack, south of Amiens, he overcame the objections of Foch and concluded arrangements for the organization of this army, which was to operate in the Lorraine sector.[12] It contained 600,000 men, fourteen American divisions and two French. On the 30th of August the sector was established and preparations made for the offensive, the first step in which was to be the wiping out of the St. Mihiel salient. This salient had existed since 1914, when the Germans, failing to storm the scarp protecting Verdun on the east, had driven a wedge across the lower heights to the south. The elimination of this wedge would have great moral effect; it would free the Paris-Nancy railway from artillery fire; and would assure Pershing an excellent base for attack against the Metz-Sedan railway system and the Briey iron basin. The German positions were naturally strong and had withstood violent French attacks in 1915. But there was only one effective line of retreat and the enemy, if he persisted in holding the apex of the salient, risked losing his entire defending force, should the sides be pressed in from the south and west.
[12] Allied opposition to an American army was so strong as to bring threats of an appeal to Wilson. The President steadfastly supported Pershing.
On the 12th of September the attack was launched. It was originally planned for the 15th, but word was brought that the Germans were about to retire at a rate which would have left none of them in the salient by that date. Hence the attack was advanced by three days. The attempted withdrawal secured the retreat of the German main force, but they were unable to save their rear guard. After four hours of vigorous artillery preparation, with the largest assemblage of aviation ever engaged in a single operation (mainly British and French) and with American heavy guns throwing into confusion all rail movements behind the German lines, the advancing Americans immediately overwhelmed all of the enemy that attempted to hold their ground. By the afternoon of the second day the salient was extinguished, 16,000 prisoners were taken, 443 guns and large stores of supplies captured. American casualties totaled less than 7000. The effects of the victory were incalculable. Apart from the material results, hope of which had motivated the attack, the moral influence of the battle of St. Mihiel in the making of American armies and the discouragement of the German High Command was of the first importance. "An American army was an accomplished fact," wrote Pershing, "and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defense. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine."
The victory of St. Mihiel was merely the necessary prelude to greater things. During the first week of September the Allied command decided that the general offensive movement of their armies should be pressed as rapidly as possible, converging upon the main line of German retreat through Mezières and Sedan. The British were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai, the center of the French armies, west of Rheims, was to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne, while the Americans were to attack through the Argonne and on both sides of the Meuse, aiming for Sedan. Pershing was given his choice of the Champagne or Argonne sectors, and chose the latter, which was the more difficult, insisting that no other Allied troops possessed the offensive spirit which would be necessary for success. In the meantime a new American army was to be organized, to operate south of Verdun and against Metz, in the spring of 1919; in fact this was designed to be the chief American effort. As matters turned out this second American army was ready to make its offensive early in November, but in September none of the Allied chiefs expressed the opinion that the final victory could be achieved in 1918. Such were the difficulties of terrain in the Argonne advance that the French did not believe that the attack could be pushed much beyond Montfaucon, between the forest and the Meuse, before winter forced a cessation of active operations.
The defensive importance of the Argonne for the Germans could hardly be overestimated, for if the railway line running through Sedan and Mezières were severed, they would be cut in two by the Ardennes and would be unable to withdraw from France the bulk of their forces, which, left without supplies, would suffer inevitable disaster. As a consequence the Argonne had been strengthened by elaborate fortifications which, taken in conjunction with the natural terrain, densely wooded, covered with rugged heights, and marked by ridges running east and west, made it apparently impregnable. The dense undergrowth, the bowlders, and the ravines offered ideal spots for machine-gun nests. The Germans had the exact range of each important position.
But Pershing's confidence in the offensive valor of the Americans was amply justified. On the morning of the 26th of September the initial attack was delivered, the main force of the blow falling east of the forest, where the natural strength of the enemy positions was less formidable. By noon of the second day Montfaucon was captured, and by the 29th all the immediate objectives of the attack were secured. Losses were heavy, staff work was frequently open to severe criticism, communications were broken at times, the infantry had not always received adequate artillery support, but the success of the drive was undeniable. Before the American troops, however, still lay two more lines of defense, the Freya and Kriemhilde, and the Germans were bringing up their best divisions. On the 4th of October the attack was renewed, in coöperation with the French under Gouraud to the west of the forest who pressed forward actively; a week's more bitter fighting saw the Argonne itself cleared of the enemy. Hard struggles ensued, particularly around Grandpré, which was taken and retaken, while on the east of the Meuse the enemy was pushed back. By the end of the month the Kriemhilde line had been broken and the great railway artery was threatened. On the 1st of November the third phase of the great advance began. The desperate efforts of the Germans to hold were never relaxed, but by the evening of that day the American troops broke through their last defense and forced rapid retreat. Motor trucks were hurriedly brought up for the pursuit, and by the fifth the enemy's withdrawal became general. Two days later Americans held the heights which dominated Sedan, the strategic goal, and the German line of communications was as good as severed.
The converging offensive planned by Foch had succeeded. At Cambrai, Le Câtelet, and St. Quentin, the British, with whom were operating four American divisions (the Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-seventh, and Ninety-first), had broken the Hindenburg line; the French had pushed the Germans back from Laon, north of the Aisne, and with the British were driving them into the narrow neck of the bottle; and now the French and Americans, by their Argonne-Meuse advance had closed the neck. The enemy faced an appalling disaster. A few weeks, if not days, of continued fighting meant the most striking military débâcle of history. Germany's allies had fallen from her. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary had sued for peace and agreed to cease fighting on what amounted to terms of unconditional surrender. At home, the German Government faced revolution; the Kaiser was about to abdicate and flee. On the 6th of November, the Berlin Government begged for an immediate armistice and five days later agreed to the stringent terms which the Allies presented. On the 11th of November, at eleven in the morning, firing ceased. Until the last second the battle raged with a useless intensity dictated by stern military tradition: then perfect quiet on the battle front.