To me, Sir, regarding this matter in the light of the Common Law and in the blaze of free institutions, it has always seemed impossible to arrive at any other conclusion. If the language of the Constitution were open to doubt, which it is not, still all the presumptions of law, all the leanings to Freedom, all the suggestions of justice, plead angel-tongued for this right. Nobody doubts that Congress, if it legislates on this matter, may allow a Trial by Jury. But if it may, so overwhelming is the claim of justice, it MUST. Beyond this, however, the question is determined by the precise letter of the Constitution.
Several expressions in the provision for the surrender of fugitives from service show the essential character of the proceedings. In the first place, the person must be, not merely charged, as in the case of fugitives from justice, but actually held to service in the State from which he escaped. In the second place, he must "be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." These two facts, that he was held to service, and that his service was due to his claimant, are directly placed in issue, and must be proved. Two necessary incidents of the delivery may also be observed. First, it is made in the State where the fugitive is found; and, secondly, it restores to the claimant complete control over the person of the fugitive. From these circumstances it is evident that the proceedings cannot be regarded, in any just sense, as preliminary, or ancillary to some future formal trial, but as complete in themselves, final and conclusive.
These proceedings determine on the one side the question of Property, and on the other the sacred question of Personal Liberty in its most transcendent form,—Liberty not merely for a day or a year, but for life, and the Liberty of generations that shall come after, so long as Slavery endures. To these questions the Constitution, by two specific provisions, attaches Trial by Jury. One is the familiar clause, already adduced: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"—that is, without due proceeding at law, with Trial by Jury. Not stopping to dwell on this, I press at once to the other provision, which is still more express: "In suits at Common Law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of Trial by Jury shall be preserved." This clause, which does not appear in the Constitution as first adopted, was suggested by the very spirit of Freedom. At the close of the National Convention, Elbridge Gerry refused to sign the Constitution because, among other things, it established "a tribunal without juries, a Star Chamber as to civil cases."[170] Many united in his opposition, and on the recommendation of the First Congress this additional safeguard was adopted as an amendment.
Now, regarding the question as one of Property, or of Personal Liberty, in either alternative the Trial by Jury is secured. For this position authority is ample. In the debate on the Fugitive Slave Bill of 1817-18, a Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Smith, anxious for the asserted right of property, objected, on this very floor, to a reference of the question, under the writ of Habeas Corpus, to a judge without a jury. Speaking solely for Property, these were his words.
"This would give a judge the sole power of deciding the right of property the master claims in his slave, instead of trying that right by a jury, as prescribed by the Constitution. He would be judge of matters of law and matters of fact, clothed with all the powers of a jury as well as the powers of a court. Such a principle is unknown in your system of jurisprudence. Your Constitution has forbid it. It preserves the right of Trial by Jury in all cases where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."[171]
But this provision has been repeatedly discussed by the Supreme Court, so that its meaning is not open to doubt. Three conditions are necessary: first, the proceeding must be "a suit"; secondly, "at Common Law"; and, thirdly, "where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars." In every such case "the right of Trial by Jury shall be preserved." Judgments of the Supreme Court cover each of these points.
First. In the case of Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 407), the Court say: "What is a suit? We understand it to be the prosecution or pursuit of some claim, demand, or request." Of course, then, the "claim" for a fugitive must be a "suit."
Secondly. In the case of Parsons v. Bedford et al. (3 Peters, 447), while considering this very clause, the Court say: "By Common Law the framers of the Constitution meant ... not merely suits which the Common Law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined.... In a just sense, the Amendment may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of Equity and Admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights." Now, since the claim for a fugitive is not a suit in Equity or Admiralty, but a suit to settle what are called legal rights, it must be a "suit at Common Law."
Thirdly. In the case of Lee v. Lee (8 Peters, 44), on a question whether "the value in controversy" was "one thousand dollars or upwards," it was objected, that the appellants, who were petitioners for Freedom, were not of the value of one thousand dollars. But the Court said: "The matter in dispute is the Freedom of the petitioners.... This is not susceptible of a pecuniary valuation.... We entertain no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Court."[172] Of course, then, since Liberty is above price, the claim to any fugitive always and necessarily presumes that "the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars."
By these successive steps, sustained by judgments of the highest tribunal, it appears, as in a diagram, that the right of Trial by Jury is secured to the fugitive from service.